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Abstract 
A major portion of the Wireless Networking Project at Sandia National Laboratories over 
the last few years has been to examine IEEE 802.11 wireless networking for possible use 
at Sandia and if practical, introduce this technology.  This project team deployed 802.11a, 
b, and g Wireless Local Area Networking at Sandia.  This report examines the basics of 
wireless networking and captures key results from project tests and experiments.  It also 
records project members’ thoughts and designs on wireless LAN architecture and 
security issues.  It documents some of the actions and milestones of this project, 
including pilot and production deployment of wireless networking equipment, and 
captures the team’s rationale behind some of the decisions made.  Finally, the report 
examines lessons learned, future directions, and conclusions. 
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1 Introduction 
 
A major portion of the Wireless Networking Project at Sandia over the last few years has 
been to examine IEEE 802.11 wireless networking for possible use at Sandia and if 
practical, introduce this technology.  This has included a study of the technology and 
existing implementations, development of a wireless network architecture as an extension 
to the current wired network, evaluation of wireless networking vendors and equipment, 
implementing pilot networks, procurement of equipment, initial equipment installations, 
development of procedures for installation and use of wireless networks, and full network 
rollout.  Various other issues, such as efficient radio frequency (RF) channel reuse plans 
and compressed video services over wireless links were also examined under this project. 
 
This report examines the basics of wireless networking and captures key results from 
project tests and experiments.  It also records project members’ thoughts and designs on 
wireless LAN architecture and security issues.  It documents some of the actions and 
milestones of this project, including pilot and production deployment of wireless 
networking equipment, and captures the team’s rationale behind some of the decisions 
made.  Finally, the report examines lessons learned, future directions, and conclusions. 
 
The project team selected 802.11a, with a 54 Mbps signaling rate, operating in the 5.15-
5.35 GHz Unlicensed National Information Infrastructure (U-NII) band of the RF 
spectrum because of its signaling rate and its avoidance of the RF-polluted Industrial, 
Scientific, and Medical (ISM) bands.  (Microwave ovens, Bluetooth devices, some 
cordless telephones, etc. operate in the 2.4 GHz ISM band, and some cordless telephones 
operate in the 5.8 GHz ISM band.)  The team also decided to support 802.11b (11 Mbps, 
2.4-2.48 GHz) because of its use in legacy devices and in handheld devices such as 
PalmPilots.  (Currently 802.11a implementations consume too much power to be 
practical for most handhelds.)  Since most equipment that supported both 802.11 a and b 
(at the time of our procurement) also supported 802.11g (54 Mbps, 2.4-2.48 GHz), and 
802.11g is starting to become available built in to laptop computers, Sandia’s wireless 
network also supports 802.11g. 
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2 Wireless Local Area Network Concepts and Topology 
 
At the point in this project where wireless LAN (WLAN) topologies were being 
examined, four topologies were being used in enterprise WLAN deployment.  They were: 
• Smart access point, 
• Gateway, 
• Wireless switch, 
• Centralized controller. 
 
A new hybrid topology that combined the wireless switch and the centralized controller 
topologies was just coming onto the scene.  A brief recap of these topologies will be 
presented here, although a full description of them can be found in a separate report [25]. 
2.1 Smart Access Point Topology 
 
‘Smart’ (also known as “heavyweight” or “fat”) wireless access points (APs) perform not 
only the wireless 802.11 functions, but also advanced features such as client 
authentication processing, traffic filtering, AP management and configuration, client 
disassociation, and event logging.  A wireless LAN based on a number of smart access 
points is said to have a smart access point topology.  An example of a smart access point 
topology is shown in Figure 1. 
 
Smart access points are self sufficient access points that can be placed anywhere in the 
network and work individually or as part of a network of APs on the same Layer 3 
subnet.  Smart APs are very flexible because of the many features they offer and the 
interoperability among different smart access point vendors.  For example, a Cisco smart 
AP could be deployed on the same IP subnet as a Proxim smart AP while still facilitating 
Layer 2 roaming 1 between the two access points.  This interoperability is facilitated by 
the IEEE 802.11f standard, known as the Inter-Access Point Protocol (IAPP). 
 
In addition to these advantages of the smart access point topology, there are also some 
disadvantages, such as lack of scalability, the complexity of managing the WLAN, and 
the relatively high cost of deployment compared to other topologies.  Smart access points 
are designed to be able to function by themselves.  They are individually configured and  
managed.  This makes them a perfect choice for small deployments.  The smart access 
point topology is not, however, well suited for large deployments because at some point it 
becomes too difficult to configure, upgrade, and manage a large number of APs 
individually. 
                                                          
1
 Layer 2 roaming is when a wireless client roams from one access point to another on the same IP subnet. 
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Figure 1. Smart access point topology. 
 
Another disadvantage of the smart access point topology is that it does not permit Layer 3 
roaming, which allows users to roam between subnets without dropping sessions.  If a 
user roams from one subnet to another, all sessions are dropped and the user must 
reassociate, reauthenticate, and obtain a new IP address. 
 
The smart access point topology may also present a security risk because the access 
points contain configuration data and encryption keys.  Network equipment such as 
switches, routers, and servers also contain configuration data and encryption keys, but 
physical access to this equipment is usually restricted by placing these devices in a locked 
room.  Access points are usually placed in open areas where it is very difficult to restrict 
physical access. 
2.2 Gateway Topology 
 
Some companies such as Vernier and Fortress Technologies have developed products 
commonly known as gateway appliances.  These devices allow for better security, Layer 
3 subnet roaming, and user/group-based security and QoS profiles.  An example of a 
gateway topology WLAN is shown in Figure 2.  Gateways are vendor-agnostic, meaning 
that standard heavyweight access points and networking switches from any vendor will 
work with them.  Gateways allow network administrators to apply QoS and security 
profiles to individual users or groups of users.  Since gateway topology WLANS use 
heavyweight APs, they suffer from the same management, scalability, and cost issues. 
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Figure 2. Gateway topology. 
  
2.3 Wireless Switch Topology 
 
In September 2002, Symbol Technologies announced a new product that had the 
advantages of the gateway solution such as layer 3 roaming, enhanced security features,  
and user/group based policy control, but also added centralized management and control 
of the access points.  This product was the first of many new “wireless switches.  An 
example of a common wireless switch topology is shown in Figure 3. 
 
The access point in the wireless switch topology differs greatly from the access point in 
the smart access point and gateway topologies.  The access points in the wireless switch 
topology are often called “lightweight” (or “dumb” or “thin”) access points.  These APs 
are designed to work together with a specialized wireless switch.  Lightweight access 
points typically only perform 802.11 wireless Ethernet to 802.3 Ethernet translation and 
occasionally do encryption/decryption.  The wireless switch performs the other necessary 
functions such as logging, monitoring, filtering, authenticating, etc. as well as providing 
power to the AP.  The access point configuration is even done at the wireless switch.  
When a lightweight AP is disconnected from its powered Ethernet connection, its 
memory is lost.  This is an attractive security feature because it is useless for attackers to 
steal and hack into the access point, since all configuration data and encryption keys are  
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Figure 3. Wireless switch topology. 
 
stored in volatile memory.  Lightweight access points are also considerably less 
expensive than their smarter counterparts. 
2.4 Centralized Controller Topology 
 
In April 2003, a wireless startup called Chantry Networks introduced a line of 802.11 
wireless products based upon a routed IP architecture.  This routed IP architecture 
differed greatly from the architecture every other 802.11 wireless company was 
promoting, and is the basis for the centralized controller topology.  An example of the 
centralized controller topology is shown in Figure 4. 
 
With a centralized controller topology, a wireless LAN controller is typically located in a 
data center or a distribution center somewhere near the core or distribution layer of the 
network.  This controller manages a large number of lightweight access points at the edge 
of the network scattered across the campus.  All packets sent to and from the wireless 
clients are passed through the centralized controller, as with the gateway and wireless 
switch solution.  The centralized controller performs the same functionality that a 
wireless switch would perform.  The difference here is that the traffic is often routed 
across Layer 3 subnets from the AP to the controller, and vice versa.   
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Figure 4. Centralized controller topology. 
 
This topology gives network designers flexibility because access points do not need to be 
directly attached to a specialized wireless switch.  Access points can be plugged into an 
Ethernet switch and will route their way back to the centralized controller for their 
configuration.  This is especially useful for situations where only a few access points are 
deployed in an area 
2.5 Hybrid Topology 
 
Airespace Networks, Aruba Networks, and Trapeze Networks have built Layer 3 routing 
capabilities into their existing wireless switch products, allowing them to function as both 
a wireless switch with direct connectivity and a centralized controller, thus combining the 
topologies discussed in sections 2.3 and 2.4.  Figure 5 shows an example of this hybrid 
topology.  In Figure 5, the access points connected to the Layer 2 Ethernet switch would 
be controlled by one of the two wireless switches in the picture.  This hybrid topology 
allows wireless switches to be used in places where access point densities would be 
higher, and small standard Ethernet switches to be used for less dense AP deployments 
such as mobile office trailers and small buildings. 
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Figure 5. Hybrid topology. 
 
This hybrid topology was deemed most suitable for use at Sandia, because of the 
flexibility it provides.  Currently, the APs are connected to Layer 2 Ethernet switches and 
controlled by wireless switches in the core of the network.  However, this topology lets 
Sandia retain the option to place a small wireless switch at the edge of the network and 
connect APs directly into it, if conditions dictate. 
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3 Wireless Client Evaluation 
 
On this project, we performed throughput tests of various PCMCIA and Cardbus wireless 
client cards to determine suitable candidate cards for use at Sandia.  We also examined 
installation procedures for necessary device drivers and associated user 
interface/configuration programs to determine ease of installation and use.  Another 
group (TechDev, the Desktop Technology Development Department) examined wireless 
clients with other types of interfaces, such as PCI, USB and Compact Flash, 
 
Although isolated screen rooms are best for controlling RF interference and ensuring 
repeatability [7], due to limited resources we performed our tests in conventional office-
type environments.  Likewise, rather than having large open spaces for testing roaming 
and handoff features, we made do in small, confined, areas.  The client cards we tested 
(and many access points, for that matter) did not lend themselves to the newer testing 
methods [7] involving wiring the test devices together with RF attenuators, combiners, 
and switches. 
 
For testing the PCMCIA and Cardbus wireless clients, we used FTP, transferring a 16 
MB test file to the system containing the client device under test (DUT).  The transfer 
was repeated at least 5 times for each DUT and the results were averaged and recorded.  
The more significant and/or interesting results are shown here in Tables 1-3. 
 
We found that in general, the host computer processor type, speed, and operating system 
had little effect on the throughput rates.  The larger factor was the make and model of 
client card (with associated drivers).  Occasionally, but not generally, the access point 
influenced the throughput. 
 
Table 1. Throughput of 802.11b Clients from a Wired Network Server. 
Make & Model of 
wireless client card 
Approximate 
Throughput (in Mbps) 
Cisco Aironet 350 4.3-4.6 
Cisco AIR-CB21ag 5.2-5.5 
Integrated (in Dell laptop) 4.5 
Integrated Prism2 (in 
Fujitsu laptop) 
3.3 
Linksys WPC51AB 4.2 
Netgear MA401 3.9-4.4 
Netgear WAB501 4.3-4.8 
Proxim Orinoco 8460-05 4.6-4.8 
Proxim Orinoco 8480-WD 4.4-6.1 
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Table 2. Throughput of 802.11a Clients from a Wired Network Server. 
Make & Model of 
wireless client card 
Approximate 
Throughput (in Mbps) 
3Com 3CRPag 14.8-15.7 
Cisco AIR-CB21ag 20.3-21.7 
Linksys WPC51AB 18.6 
Netgear WAB501 14.4 
Proxim Orinoco 8460-05 19.0-21.7 
Proxim Orinoco 8480-WD 15.4-18.1 
 
 
Table 3. Throughput of 802.11g Clients From a Wired Network Server. 
Make & Model of wireless 
client card 
Approximate 
Throughput (in Mbps) 
3Com 3CRPag 9.7-15.5 
Cisco AIR-CB21ag 17.6-19.9 
Integrated (in HP Compaq 
laptop) 
14.0-15.0 
Integrated Intel Pro 2200BG 
(in Toshiba laptop) 
15.0-16.2 
Proxim Orinoco 8480-WD 12.9-17.5 
 
Note that most of the devices fell into the same performance ranges.  In Table 1, the 
performance of the Integrated Prism 2 in the Fujitsu may be artificially low.  We found 
the Fujitsu had slower wireless performance with all wireless clients.  This may be due to 
the Transmeta 5800 processor and the way it processes the Intel instruction set.  The 
Netgear WAB501 a/b card, shown in Table 2, seems to have a lower than expected 
performance and the newer Prxim Orinoco a/b/g devices (8480-WD) produced slightly 
slower results than the older devices a/b (8460-05). 
 
The software (drivers and configuration programs) for some cards installed “cleanly” but 
software for some of the other cards was more troublesome.  Generally, the software for 
the Cisco and Proxim Orinoco cards installed without problems and allowed easy 
configuration of the DUT.  Generally, the software for the Linksys and Netgear cards 
required tweaking and fiddling to get the card working properly, a definite disadvantage 
in large deployments.  The 3Com card had installation problems in some cases, but once 
installed, operated well. 
 
After performing testing and evaluation, we recommended the Proxim Orinoco 8460-05 
(802.11a/b) card for situations demanding the highest performance and the Proxim 
Orinoco 8480-WD (802.11a/b/g) for overall versatility.  (The Orinoco 8480-WD wireless 
client card is a Cardbus card, but works in older PCMCIA-slotted systems.)  After further 
examination by TechDev, they confirmed the Proxim Orinoco 8480-WD (802.11a/b/g) 
card as the corporate recommendation.  Since that time, the older 8460-05 (802.11a/b) 
card has been discontinued by Proxim in favor of the more flexible 8480-WD 
(802.11a/b/g) card. 
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The Cisco 802.11a/b/g wireless card was not available at the time of our initial client card 
testing.  Once it became available, we tested and evaluated the AIR-CB21ag wireless 
client card from Cisco and concluded it could be a good alternative for systems with 
Cardbus (32 bit) slots.  This card is not backward compatible with PCMCIA (16 bit) 
slots, but did exhibit consistently good performance (regarding both throughput and 
mobility characteristics) in modern systems.  Eventually the Cisco AIR-CB21ag wireless 
client card was recommended by TechDev instead of the Proxim 8480-WD. 
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4 Wireless Access Point Evaluation 
 
Some formal testing of APs was performed to learn the general characteristics and 
operation of access points.  Some range testing was performed in the 2.4 GHz band and 
some load testing was performed to examine lightweight vs. fat AP behavior at 11 and 54 
Mbps rates.  Informal testing was performed to determine ease of configuration and 
management, throughput, and various vendor-dependent features. 
4.1 Range Testing 
 
Indoor testing of APs for range was a futile exercise because of interior wall construction, 
door construction, various obstacles with differing tendencies to block radio waves at 
various frequencies, and whether interior doors were open or closed.  Only a minimal 
amount of outdoor, open field range testing was performed for this project, since most of 
our wireless infrastructure deployment at Sandia is expected to be indoors. 
 
The AP used for this testing was a D-Link DWL-1000, 802.11b.  Two clients were used.  
One was a Gateway laptop containing a 1.06 GHz Pentium III processor and a Proxim 
Orinoco 8460-05 (802.11a/b) card.  The other was a Fujitsu sub-notebook with an 800 
MHz Crusoe TM5800 processor and a Proxim Orinoco 8480-WD (802.11a/b/g) card. 
 
The results of the open field testing (as measured by the Proxim client utility, in db) are 
listed in Table 4.  Both client systems lost their connection to the 802.11b access point at 
a distance between 275 and 300 feet from the AP. 
 
Table 4. Signal Strengths at Various Distances from the AP. 
Distance 
from AP (ft.) 
Gateway/Proxim 
Client (db) 
Fujitsu/Proxim 
Client (db) 
 
25 30 31  
100 12 32  
150 20 10  
200 19 7  
250 16 18  
275 21 17  
300 8 9 Both connections lost 
4.2 Load Testing 
 
We performed load testing of access points to observe the AP’s behavior under an 
increasing load.  We used the following procedure: 
 
1. Benchmark each client (system/wireless interface) alone against the AP in question 
using IPERF. 
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2. Add clients, one at a time, executing the IPERF test.  (Set up for the appropriate test 
and hit ‘enter’ simultaneously on all clients.)  Do not change the location of the 
clients between the time of calibration (benchmarking) and testing of a given AP. 
3. Collect data and plot both average and aggregate throughput for IPERF. 
4. Repeat for the next AP to be tested until all APs have been tested. 
Access Points to be tested: 
• Trapeze (A mode) 
• Trapeze (B mode) 
• Trapeze (G mode) 
• Cisco (A mode) 
• Cisco (B mode) 
• Proxim (A mode) 
• Belkin (G mode) 
 
This would show us the response of both heavyweight (fat) and lightweight (thin) APs to 
increasing load.  The data is summarized in Tables 5-11. 
 
Table 5. Trapeze 802.11a Throughput Rates. 
Number of 
simultaneous 
clients 
Client 1 
(Mbps) 
Client 2 
(Mbps) 
Client 3 
(Mbps) 
Client 4 
(Mbps) 
Client 5 
(Mbps) 
Client 6 
(Mbps) 
Aggregate 
(Mbps) 
1 14.8      14.8 
2 10.5 7.7     18.2 
3 4.7 4.3 6.5    15.5 
4 2.9 2.4 6.4 2.6   14.3 
5 2.2 2.3 6.0 1.9 2.3  14.7 
6 2.0 1.5 6.0 1.7 1.8 1.8 14.8 
 
Table 6. Trapeze 802.11b Throughput Rates. 
Number of 
simultaneous 
clients 
Client 1 
(Mbps) 
Client 2 
(Mbps) 
Client 3 
(Mbps) 
Client 4 
(Mbps) 
Client 5 
(Mbps) 
Client 6 
(Mbps) 
Aggregate 
(Mbps) 
1 4.1      4.1 
2 2.3 2.2     4.5 
3 1.5 1.4 2.0    4.9 
4 1.3 0.9 1.5 1.7   5.4 
5 1.0 .9 1.2 1.4 .9  5.4 
6 0.8 0.6 0.9 1.1 0.8 0.8 5.0 
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Table 7. Trapeze 802.11g Throughput Rates 
Number of 
simultaneous 
clients 
Client 1 
(Mbps) 
Client 2 
(Mbps) 
Client 3 
(Mbps) 
Client 4 
(Mbps) 
Client 5 
(Mbps) 
Client 6 
(Mbps) 
Aggregate 
(Mbps) 
1 6.6      6.6 
2 4.1 3.4     7.5 
3 2.1 1.8 4.7    8.6 
4 1.9 1.8 4.1 19.2   27.0 
5 1.2 1.4 3.6 19.2 2.2  27.6 
6 1.4 1.0 2.5 19.1 1.5 1.5 27.0 
 
Table 8. Cisco 802.11a Throughput Rates. 
Number of 
simultaneous 
clients 
Client 1 
(Mbps) 
Client 2 
(Mbps) 
Client 3 
(Mbps) 
Client 4 
(Mbps) 
Client 5 
(Mbps) 
Client 6 
(Mbps) 
Aggregate 
(Mbps) 
1 12.7      12.7 
2 9.1 6.5     15.6 
3 4.6 2.7 8.7    16.0 
4 2.8 2.1 7.0 3.3   15.2 
5 2.5 2.0 6.2 2.5 2.4  15.6 
6 2.3 1.6 5.2 2.0 2.3 2.1 15.5 
 
Table 9. Cisco 802.11b Throughput Rates. 
Number of 
simultaneous 
clients 
Client 1 
(Mbps) 
Client 2 
(Mbps) 
Client 3 
(Mbps) 
Client 4 
(Mbps) 
Client 5 
(Mbps) 
Client 6 
(Mbps) 
Aggregate 
(Mbps) 
1 4.7      4.7 
2 2.5 2.6     5.1 
3 1.1 1.2 3.4    5.7 
4 0.9 1.0 2.9 1.0   5.8 
5 0.7 0.7 2.9 0.8 0.7  5.9 
6 0.7 0.6 2.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 6.0 
 
Table 10. Proxim 802.11a Throughput Rates. 
Number of 
simultaneous 
clients 
Client 1 
(Mbps) 
Client 2 
(Mbps) 
Client 3 
(Mbps) 
Client 4 
(Mbps) 
Client 5 
(Mbps) 
Client 6 
(Mbps) 
Aggregate 
(Mbps) 
1 12.1      12.1 
2 11.3 8.1     19.4 
3 4.9 4.6 7.3    16.8 
4 3.6 3.7 6.9 4.3   18.5 
5 2.8 2.5 7.3 2.6 2.8  18.0 
6 2.5 1.7 6.0 2.6 2.2 2.7 17.7 
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Table 11. Belkin 802.11g Throughput Rates. 
Number of 
simultaneous 
clients 
Client 1 
(Mbps) 
Client 2 
(Mbps) 
Client 3 
(Mbps) 
Client 4 
(Mbps) 
Client 5 
(Mbps) 
Client 6 
(Mbps) 
Aggregate 
(Mbps) 
1 12.3      12.3 
2 7.0 8.1     15.1 
3 2.8 2.5 10.5    15.8 
4 2.3 2.2 9.0 3.2   16.7 
5 1.8 1.9 7.7 2.5 2.7  16.6 
6 1.7 2.1 7.3 1.9 1.9 1.9 16.8 
 
Our observations were as follows: 
 
• Heavyweight vs. lightweight access points did not make a significant difference. 
 
• Generally, average throughput decreased in an exponential fashion with increasing 
client load.  The average aggregate throughput increased with client load and levels 
out at about 2-3 clients, with possibly only slight increases after that point.  Trapeze 
G mode is an exception.  This is illustrated by Figure 6-Figure 11. 
 
• Once you get above the saturation number of clients (2-3), aggregate throughput and 
hence, percent utilization, is about constant.  Aggregate throughput is split between 
one “head hog at the trough” and all others.  The others (other than the “head hog”) 
split the remaining bandwidth about equally. 
 
• Average aggregate throughput for 2 or more clients is 25-35% of the 54 Mbps 
signaling rate for 802.11a; about 45-55% of the 11 Mbps signaling rate for 802.11b.  
One client gets the largest portion, and the remaining clients split what remains. 
 
An approximation of the expected rate might be: 
 
From our tests of the Trapeze access point in 802.11a mode, we found that the maximum 
client throughput was asymptotically approaching a floor of 5-6 Mbps (see Table 5).  
This indicates that with more than just 3 or 4 clients in use, one client would probably be 
supported at about 6 Mbps, with the remaining clients supported equally at a slice of the 
remaining bandwidth.  Observing from Figure 7 that the aggregate throughput of the 
Trapeze access point operating in 802.11a mode is about 15 Mbps, and using the 
approximation above to estimate how many clients could be supported (active at exactly 
the same time) with a floor of 1 Mbps to each client, we see that 10 clients could be 
supported (1 at about 6 Mbps and 9 at about 1 Mbps). 
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If the “head hog” only received about 5 Mbps, then the other 9 clients would likely each 
receive about 1.1 Mbps, or potentially 10 clients could be supported at about 1 Mbps, 
bringing the total number of clients supported by this access point to 11.  In practice a 
greater number of clients could likely be supported at these rates or better, as they would 
likely not all be active at the same moment. 
 
To find a point where access point performance drops off drastically, or the access point 
completely stops functioning due to load, would take more equipment than we had 
available.  At some point, with a heavy enough load where access point firmware 
limitations are being approached, it would be interesting to see if new connections are 
rejected or if they are accepted and possibly causing overflows in tables.  Our suspicion is 
that before that point is reached, performance would be poor enough that additional 
clients would not try to associate. 
 
In summary, we have observed performance characteristics that seem to be very similar 
across types and brands of access points and operating modes.  Aggregate throughput of 
an access point levels out quickly to a constant amount and when that happens, one client 
gets the largest portion of that aggregate, while the remaining clients share the remaining 
amount approximately equally. 
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Figure 6. Average Client Throughput on 802.11a Access Points. 
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Figure 7. Aggregate Client Throughput on 802.11a Access Points. 
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Figure 8. Average Client Throughput on 802.11b Access Points. 
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Figure 9. Client Throughput on 802.11b Access Points. 
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Figure 10. Average Client Throughput on 802.11g Access Points. 
 
 
802.11 G
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
30.0
1 2 3 4 5 6
Number of Clients
A
ve
ra
ge
 
A
gg
re
ga
te
 
Th
ro
u
gh
pu
t
Belkin G
Trapeze G
 
Figure 11. Aggregate Client Throughput on 802.11a Access Points. 
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4.3 Product Evaluation 
 
One of the first tasks for the wireless networking project was to become familiar with the 
802.11 wireless infrastructure technologies in order to make choices as to what product or 
products would be evaluated prior to making a large-scale purchasing decision.  After 
reading 802.11 literature and scanning the wireless market, product specifications were 
gathered.  The team also attended network trade shows in order to meet many of the 
802.11 vendors, learn of their products, and ask questions.  The wireless networking team 
then evaluated wireless networking topologies, systems, and their components. 
4.3.1 New Mexico 
 
At Sandia, NM, several wireless networking testbeds were built.  These were used to 
conduct much of the AP testing and client card testing.  The testbeds provided the WLAN 
team with the requisite flexibility to test and evaluate a variety of products supporting the 
WLAN topologies described in section 2 of this report. 
 
It was clear early on that Cisco was the market leader for 802.11.  The team decided to 
purchase some Cisco 802.11 access points for testing and deploying in pilot installations.  
Cisco Aironet 1200 access points were purchased and tested for range and throughput, 
then installed in two locations for initial user testing, as described in section 8.1.1. 
 
There was already a move in the industry away from self-contained or “smart” access 
points (such as the Cisco Aironet) to “dumb” access points that required a switch or 
controller to provide the configuration and functionality (intelligence) to the access point.  
The primary benefit of this technology is the lower cost of each access point due to the 
lower demands on the hardware.  An additional and very important benefit is the ability 
to manage many access points from a single control point.  The team recognized the 
benefits of this type of approach and decided that further product evaluations would focus 
on the “dumb” access point design.  This product space was growing rapidly, with some 
established companies producing products and several start-ups entering the market. 
 
Several vendors were contacted for obtaining products for testing.  Access points and 
switches or appliances from Airespace, Inc., Aruba Networks, Chantry Networks, 
Symbol Technologies, and Trapeze Networks were obtained through loan agreements.  
The equipment was tested in a lab environment.  Throughput tests were conducted to 
determine the maximum data rates that the access points could sustain.  Rates were 
determined using both file transfers (FTP) and memory-to-memory transfers (iperf2).  
The file transfer tests (using a file of approximately 16 MB in length) represent “real life” 
results, or what one could reasonably expect from actual data transfers.  The memory-to-
memory tests are more academic in that they represent the maximum transfer rates that a 
particular situation can attain.  This is useful for setting the ceiling of expectation (i.e. 
                                                          
2
 http://dast.nlanr.net/Projects/Iperf/. Iperf is a software tool for testing end-to-end data transfer capability.  
Data is written from memory to the device network interface, across the network, into the receiving 
interface, and to the memory of the receiving device.  No transfer to hard drive takes place, which can slow 
the transfer process considerably. 
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“it’s the best it can possibly do”).  A conclusion that came out of the testing was that 
most WLAN infrastructure products performed similarly as far as throughput on a given 
band was concerned.  So, this would most likely not be a deciding factor in 
differentiating the products. 
 
A small amount of equipment was purchased from Symbol, tested in the lab, and then 
deployed in a building.  However, there was difficulty in getting the equipment 
operational, and the effort was abandoned in favor of waiting for a better solution. 
 
A WLAN design was developed that encompassed the hybrid topology (see section 2.5) 
using a combination of “dumb” access points, wireless switches, and wireless controllers.  
It does not rely only on wireless controllers or wireless switches, but allows for either 
type for whatever the particular situation warrants. 
 
From this design, an RFQ was written for soliciting bids for a large purchase of WLAN 
equipment to position Sandia to begin deploying wireless.  The RFQ process (described 
in section 9), which took several months to complete, resulted in the purchase of 
equipment from Aruba Networks. 
4.3.2 California 
 
Sandia, CA evaluated two WLAN vendors products — the Cisco 1200 series APs and the 
Trapeze Networks mobility system.  The Cisco WLAN equipment consisted of the 1200 
series APs and the associated Power over Ethernet (PoE) injectors needed.  The Trapeze 
Networks mobility system consisted of a WLAN switch, APs that were connected to the 
switch (directly connected at first then indirectly connected later), and a server running 
the WLAN planning and management software called Ringmaster. 
 
First, the Cisco 1200 series APs were evaluated by installing them in building MO52 
after conducting a manual site survey to determine where to place them and what power 
and channel settings to configure.  After installation, measurements were made to make 
sure good RF coverage was available throughout the building.  WLAN packets were 
captured and analyzed with AirMagnet and AiroPeek to see how well the WLAN was 
working, and computer security was invited to watch the area for any problems.  After 
making sure that the WLAN worked as it was supposed to, about 6 to 8 MO52 pilot users 
were invited to start using the WLAN via a Virtual Private Network (VPN) connection to 
the Sandia Open Network (SON), with Sandia Restricted Network (SRN) access coming 
later after computer security was satisfied that the risk was acceptable.  The initial pilot 
consisted of user machines running Windows, Mac OS, and Linux so part of the 
evaluation was to see how well these different operating systems worked on the WLAN 
using the required VPN client software.  The test users provided regular feedback as to 
how the WLAN was working for them. 
 
The results were that the WLAN worked fine but the Linux VPN client had some 
problems.  As newer versions of the Cisco VPN client for Linux became available, the 
client became more stable and there were fewer-to-no complaints concerning the VPN 
27 
client or the WLAN.  During the time that the MO52 users were exercising the Cisco-
based WLAN, work began to deploy and evaluate the Trapeze Networks equipment. 
 
After seeing how well the Trapeze mobility system worked at their headquarters, we 
decided to take them up on their offer to deploy their system at Sandia, CA for 
evaluation.  At that time, the most desirable feature of the Trapeze system was the 
planning tool looked to be much easier to use than a traditional site survey and seemed 
like it would be a real time saver.  Buildings MO50/51 were selected because of their 
central location in the Property Protection Area (PPA), the fact that it would be a small, 
but non-trivial deployment (12 APs, hence quite manageable), and that there were some 
willing users located there.  After planning the AP locations and configurations, and 
installing the Trapeze hardware, the system was tested for RF coverage, throughput, 
security, and usability.  Not only was the RF coverage verified with tools like AirMagnet 
and AiroPeek, but also with a WLAN-enabled laptop connected to the SRN via VPN 
running a continuous ping to an offsite location.  This test was conducted while walking 
around the buildings and roaming between APs.  It gave an indication that there was good 
coverage and the VPN wouldn’t drop while roaming between APs.  When the laptop 
roamed from one AP to another, a few pings might drop but the connection would stay up 
and the VPN client was unaffected.  Throughput was measured while connected via the 
VPN over various wireless network interface cards (NICs) using a tool called Chariot 
from NetIQ and also by timing the Windows file share transfer of a large (approximately 
1 GB) directory.  The measured throughput varied slightly between NICs but was 
normally around 4.5 Mb/s for 802.11b and about 18 Mb/s for 802.11g.  After testing the 
new Trapeze system, users in MO50/51 were invited to begin using the WLAN and 
provide feedback often.  About 6 users began using the WLAN in MO50/51 and the 
feedback was infrequent, but those who did provide feedback seemed to have no 
problems except for an occasional issue with the VPN client.  Through all of the WLAN 
testing at Sandia, CA, the common factors that caused problems were usually the VPN 
client or the client firewall. 
 
The Sandia, CA networking department had access to some year-end funds in FY03 and 
used some of it for wireless networking equipment, so the first purchase of Trapeze 
Networks equipment was made at that time.  The equipment that Trapeze Networks 
loaned Sandia, CA for the MO50/51 evaluation was purchased, as well as some 
additional hardware.  After purchasing the Trapeze Networks equipment in the summer 
of 2003, Sandia, CA began deploying it in favor of the Cisco 1200 series equipment and 
eventually replaced all the Cisco APs with Trapeze APs.  During the one year period 
from when the Trapeze Networks evaluation equipment was installed and the funds were 
allocated to purchase wireless equipment for “production” networking, several more 
locations in the Sandia, CA Property Protection Area were outfitted with the additional 
wireless equipment from Trapeze Networks.  In summer 2004, when funds were 
allocated to purchase and deploy “production” wireless networking equipment, Sandia, 
CA chose to remain with the Trapeze Networks, based on the features, equipment cost, 
and compatibility and experience with existing equipment (see section 9). 
28 
 
5 Wireless Local Area Network Architecture 
 
This design reflects the SNL/NM wireless networking system but does not directly 
address remote wireless networks at home and on travel.  Also, the SNL/CA wireless 
networking system is a separate but integrated effort and while not fully addressed here, 
is referenced and partially described. 
5.1 Background 
 
Stand-alone access points are self-contained units such as the consumer type found in 
homes, as well as enterprise-class units.  Enterprise-class stand-alone access points are 
relatively expensive, and difficult to manage since each unit must be managed separately, 
or managed as a whole with a separate software package.  Also, if a stand-alone access 
point is lost or stolen, an adversary could potentially extract network and security 
configuration information stored in the access point. 
 
In contrast to stand-alone access points, OSI Layer 2 or Layer 3 wireless systems employ 
“dumb” access points that do not store significant configuration information within them.  
They obtain configuration information from a wireless switch or controller, and lose the 
configuration when power is lost (such as would happen if a dumb access point is stolen).  
This also reduces the cost of each access point since each does not require the memory or 
processing power needed to support various services such as a web server, SSH server, 
etc.  An additional benefit of the wireless switch or controller technology is the built-in 
centralized control of the access points.  These systems control all attached access points. 
 
SNL has chosen not to deploy stand-alone access points for reasons of cost, security, and 
manageability.  The most versatile solution that meets cost, security, and manageability 
requirements is the hybrid approach (see section 2.5 for a more detailed description), 
which SNL has chosen to deploy.  The hybrid approach provides wireless switches where 
concentrations of access points are high enough to warrant a switch, and provides 
wireless controllers where low access point density favors routing “dumb” access points 
to a central location. 
 
The basic concept of the WLAN at SNL is an isolated network that provides wireless 
access service to the SNL wired networks, using the SON as the transport infrastructure.  
The SON is chosen because wireless networking is treated as remote access, since the 
airwaves are beyond our physical control.  Ideally, a physically separate infrastructure 
should be utilized for wireless access; however, this is not practical from a cost 
standpoint with such a large enterprise as SNL.  A compromise is to use the SON 
infrastructure.  This will require augmentation of the SON in areas where existing SON 
infrastructure is inadequate for a particular wireless installation, and will require 
additional SON infrastructure where there is none available for a particular wireless 
installation. 
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An isolated portion of the SON contains the wireless access points and switches, 
separated from the remainder of the SON by a firewall (or router access control list -- 
ACL)3.  Access to the remainder of the SON and to the SRN is by VPN only.  VPN 
access provides privacy by strong encryption (Triple DES), and authentication by two-
factor SecurID or CRYPTOCard, using SNL’s existing VPN service. 
 
Due to the limitations of Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) and the lack of a suitable 
Layer 2 protection replacement at the time of implementation, no Layer 2 protection is 
provided to the wireless network.  Authentication and encryption are provided at Layer 3 
by the VPN. 
5.2 Wireless Network Usage Policy 
 
Connection of wireless access points to the SRN is not allowed.  A separate external 
network must be used for wireless devices (e.g. SON).  Wireless network users must have 
a computer and wireless network card registered in NWIS and have a wireless device that 
meets the configuration requirements consistent with the security design. 
5.2.1 Acceptable use guidelines 
 
Wireless Network Access.  Wireless devices can be used to connect to the wireless 
network if requirements for device registration and proper use are met.  All wireless 
devices must be registered in NWIS, and users must be aware of proper use, including 
knowing where wireless use is permitted and where it is not permitted. 
 
Wireless Network to SRN.  The wireless network is outside the SRN and beyond 
physical control (air waves); therefore, Laboratory-approved remote access methods must 
be used (e.g., 2-factor authentication and VPN software) to gain access to the SRN. 
 
SRN to Wireless Network.  Pinging wireless devices from the internal network is 
allowed.  For access to mobile devices on the wireless network, authorized users can use 
secure shell over their internal network connection to the target device.  Dual active 
network interfaces (one wired on internal network and one wireless on wireless network) 
are not allowed. 
 
Internet to Wireless Network.  No direct access is allowed from the Internet to SNL 
wireless clients. 
5.2.2 Ad Hoc Networks 
Ad hoc networks, also known as peer-to-peer networking, are networks where clients 
communicate directly with each other, not through an access point.  These networks are 
not permitted due to the difficulty in enforcing necessary security practices and policies. 
                                                          
3
 A firewall is preferable for this application due to its stateful packet inspection and logging capability. 
However, for Phase I, it would be simpler to implement a router ACL, and save the firewall for Phase II 
and the DMZ. 
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5.3 Wireless Design 
 
The SNL/NM WLAN design is modeled after the SNL/CA WLAN design, but extended 
to encompass the larger NM campus.  The CA model is a single VLAN built on the SON, 
serving the entire CA campus.  This single WLAN VLAN isolates wireless devices from 
all other SON traffic.  While realizable at CA due to the relatively small campus size, it 
does not scale at NM.  Instead, by utilizing the “right-sized” design approach as specified 
in the Network Architecture and Design document [13], the CA model can simply be 
duplicated over several NM “right-sized” regions as shown in Figure 12. 
 
 
 
Figure 12. WLAN Architecture. 
 
In this model, a single SON VLAN is dedicated to the WLAN within each region, 
functioning as a wired backbone for wireless access points.  This SON VLAN separates 
wireless devices from the remainder of the SON, negating the need to operate a single 
WLAN VLAN over the entire enterprise network.  Each WLAN region would 
correspond to the wired LAN regions. 
 
Figure 12 shows three WLAN regions, X, Y, and n, where n is any number of duplicated 
regions as necessary to service all desired areas.  Region X is further broken out to show 
how access points connect to WLAN switches, which in turn connect to SON distribution 
switches.  A single VLAN in Region X keeps all access points and wireless switches 
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isolated at Layer 2 from all other SON traffic4.  Isolation at Layer 3 and above is 
accomplished by firewall or router ACL. 
 
A wireless client attempting to associate to an access point will initially authenticate to 
the access point using open authentication5.  After successful association, the client will 
have access outside the WLAN only to DHCP for IP address assignment, ICMP ECHO 
(ping) for testing, and the VPN concentrator for access to the SRN.  No access into the 
WLAN will be permissible from the Internet.  This restriction is provided by a firewall or 
router ACL at the point where the WLAN meets the SON (at Layer 3 and above). 
 
Access to the SRN is accomplished by running the client VPN and authenticating the user 
using SecurID or CRYPTOCard.  This is the same VPN client as used for remote access 
(Cisco), so no further software development or deployment is necessary.  WLAN users 
simply enable VPN access through WebCARS if this has not been done already for wired 
remote access through the VPN. 
5.3.1 User Access 
 
Referring to Figure 12, a WLAN client must first associate with an access point.  The 
WLAN client will receive an IP address such as 10.1.0.1 from DHCP.  Once the IP 
address is assigned, the client will have access only to the VPN concentrator as a result of 
the firewall or router ACL that limits access.  The user then starts the VPN software, 
establishes contact with the VPN concentrator, and authenticates using SecurID or 
CRYPTOCard.  The client is now connected to the SRN.  The path from the client to the 
SRN is encrypted using Triple DES. 
5.3.2 Compatibility with CA 
 
The NM and CA WLAN efforts are being closely coordinated so that a final solution will 
allow interoperability between the sites. 
5.4 Throughput Considerations 
 
802.11a – signal rate is 54 Mbps.  Data rate is approximately ½ the signal rate, or about 
22 Mbps.  Typical measured throughput is approximately 15-21 Mbps. 
 
802.11b – signal rate is 11 Mbps.  Data rate is approximately ½ the signal rate, or about 6 
Mbps.  Typical measured throughput is approximately 4-6 Mbps. 
 
                                                          
4
 See http://www.cisco.com/go/safe, Cisco’s comprehensive set of guidelines for ensuring VLAN security. 
Layer 2 separation is a compromise since there are known vulnerabilities. A completely separate wireless 
network is preferable but not realizable. 
5
 The initial pilot implementations at NM used WEP. However, this was discontinued after discussions with 
SNL/CA in order maintain compatibility between the sites. WPA is becoming available across many 
products and could be phased in as a replacement for WEP. 802.11i will eventually replace both WEP and 
WPA. 
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802.11g – signal rate is 54 Mbps.  Data rate is approximately ½ the signal rate, or about 
22 Mbps.  Typical measured throughput is approximately 13-20 Mbps.  However, mixing 
both 802.11b and 802.11g clients results in an 802.11g signal rate of about 11 Mbps due 
to design constraints of 802.11b/g compatibility.  This reduces overall throughput for an 
802.11b/g system.  It is anticipated that 802.11b clients will eventually disappear in favor 
of 802.11a and 802.11g, thus eliminating the constraint on 802.11g performance.  
However, until that day comes, 802.11g will potentially suffer from the mixed 
environment. 
 
With the VPN client, WLAN throughput drops considerably due to the software 
encryption overhead placed on the client device, and the sharing of bandwidth with other 
VPN clients at the VPN concentrator.  Wired connections see a decrease in throughput 
from about 25-33 Mbps down to about 10 Mbps.  Wireless connection throughput ranges 
from 4 to 8 Mbps.  This rate is largely dependent on the particular WLAN client 
machine:  the faster the machine, the better the WLAN/VPN throughput.  As can be seen 
here, the VPN will throttle the throughput rates of 802.11a and 802.11g, even though the 
observed rates of the various cards listed in section 3 are considerably higher. 
5.4.1 Wireless Clients 
 
Because a wireless access point is a shared-medium device, the maximum throughput 
must be divided amongst wireless clients.  For example, for an 802.11a system, the 
maximum throughput of 20 Mbps must be divided by the number of simultaneous clients.  
If 10 wireless clients are associated to an 802.11a access point, then each client could 
experience an average throughput of 2 Mbps.  For an 802.11b access point, 10 clients 
would experience an average throughput of 600 Kbps.  Our load testing experiments 
(section 4.2) revealed some inequities (regarding client throughput) in sharing the 
transmission medium. 
 
As a result of the sharing of bandwidth, it is recommended that 802.11a access points be 
limited to approximately 10 simultaneous wireless clients, with a maximum of 
approximately 20 clients.  For 802.11b, only approximately 5 simultaneous wireless 
clients can be effectively supported, with a maximum of approximately 10 clients.  For 
802.11g, the numbers are the same as for 802.11a.  However, the combination of 802.11b 
and 802.11g must be considered, which unfortunately keeps the recommended number of 
wireless clients at approximately 5. 
5.4.2 VPN Concentrator 
 
A potential bottleneck for the wireless system is the VPN concentrator that provides 
access to the SRN.  The current concentrator is a Cisco VPN 3030, with 50 Mbps 
maximum encrypted throughput and shared between wireless access and Internet access.  
A single wireless switch, fully populated and running at maximum throughput, will easily 
overrun the VPN concentrator.  This can be mitigated by clustering several existing VPN 
3030 concentrators in a load-sharing configuration. 
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Three VPN 3030 concentrators in a load-sharing configuration can support up to 150 
Mbps of encrypted traffic.  Additional concentrators can be added to the cluster as 
needed, including more capable concentrators such as the VPN 3060 or 3080 (however, 
all Cisco VPN concentrators are currently limited to Fast Ethernet interfaces; no Gigabit 
Ethernet interfaces are available). 
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6 Wireless LAN Security Approach 
6.1 SNL Wireless Security Design 
 
The WLAN at SNL is an isolated network that provides wireless access service to the 
SNL wired networks, using the SON as the transport infrastructure.  Figure 13 shows the 
high-level design.  The wireless network is built on an isolated portion of the SON.  This 
isolated portion is separated from the remainder of the SON by a firewall. 
 
 
Figure 13. SNL Wireless LAN Design. 
 
Wireless networking at Sandia is treated and protected like remote access, since the RF 
airwaves are beyond our physical control.  Wireless access to the SRN and the non-
wireless portion of the SON requires a VPN. VPN access provides privacy by strong 
encryption (3DES), and authentication by two-factor SecurID or CRYPTOCard, using 
SNL’s existing VPN service. 
 
A single SON VLAN is dedicated to the WLAN within each region, functioning as a 
wired backbone for wireless access points, as shown in Figure 13.  Each WLAN region 
corresponds approximately to the existing wired LAN regions.  Figure 13 shows three 
WLAN regions, X, Y, and n, where n is any number of duplicated regions as necessary to 
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service all desired areas. Region X is further broken out to show how access points 
connect to LAN switches, which in turn connect to SON distribution switches, then to the 
wireless switch (wireless controller). A single wireless VLAN in Region X keeps all 
access points and wireless switches isolated at Layer 2 from all other SON traffic. 
Isolation at Layer 3 and above is accomplished by firewall. 
6.2 User Access 
 
Referring to Figure 13, a WLAN client that associates with an access point will receive 
an IP address such as 10.1.0.17 (for example) from DHCP (if the client’s MAC address is 
registered in Sandia’s NWIS database).  Once the IP address is assigned, the client will 
have access only to the VPN concentrator, as a result of the firewall that limits access.  
The user then starts the VPN software, establishes a connection to the VPN concentrator, 
and authenticates using SecurID or CRYPTOCard.  Following these steps, the client is 
now connected to the SRN.  The path from the client to the SRN is encrypted using 
3DES.  
 
Any wireless client that does not possess the proper VPN credentials, such as the group 
key and valid two-factor token card, will not be able to access any network resources.   
6.3 Cyber-Security Threats, Risks, and Mitigations 
6.3.1 Insertion Attack 
 
An insertion attack is a security breach that takes place when unauthorized devices 
connect to the wired or wireless network without proper security process and review.   
The unauthorized device could be a client or an access point.  If an access point is not 
correctly configured or connected using the proper network topology, an unauthorized 
client may associate with the access point and gain access to the network.   
 
Access points are fairly inexpensive and can be easily purchased at many electronics 
stores.  The ease of buying and deploying access points often makes it attractive for 
individuals in an organization to put up their own access points and plug them directly 
into the wired network.  This is known as a rogue access point because it is not supported 
by the networking staff.  Rogue access points present a security risk because they are 
often not properly secured and can allow unauthorized access to the network.  An 
intruder gaining access to the facilities could also connect a rogue access point to the 
wired network to allow remote access to the network from outside the physical facilities. 
6.3.2 Insertion Attack Defenses 
 
Sandia has established policies prohibiting the addition of access points without prior 
approval from Computer Security.  Continuous rogue access point detection and 
containment will be performed by the production wireless system in many areas across 
Sandia’s Albuquerque and Livermore campuses.  If a rogue access point is attached to a 
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wired network at Sandia, the deployed production wireless system in the area will detect 
the rogue, alert the necessary personnel, and contain the rogue if requested. 
 
Any areas not covered by automatic rogue access point detection will be manually swept 
to ensure that no rogue access points exist.  Manual detection is the least efficient rogue 
access detection method and will only be done when automatic detection is not feasible. 
6.3.3 Interception and Monitoring Attack 
 
Sandia’s wireless LANs use RF to provide a wireless connection to wireless enabled 
devices.  As previously mentioned, RF signals cannot be constrained to a room or 
building in a practical manner.  An attacker could easily intercept and monitor RF signals 
from the organization’s parking lot or even miles away with a high-gain directional 
antenna. 
 
Passive monitoring of the WLAN presents a greater threat than insertion attacks.  With 
insertion attacks, an intruder gaining access to the network can be tracked down and 
preventive measures can be taken.  Passive monitoring allows an attacker to capture 
traffic without being easily detected.  If an attacker is able to intercept authentication 
credentials, the attacker could then access the network as an authorized user, making it 
very difficult to detect the intruder.  The attacker could also opt to continue undetected as 
a passive monitor. 
6.3.4 Interception and Monitoring Attack Defenses  
 
Sandia requires all SNL wireless clients to use a VPN to sufficiently protect the traffic 
from interception.  Figure 13 shows that the Sandia wireless LAN will be placed on a 
separate network from the SRN with a firewall and VPN concentrator separating the two 
networks.  No user services will be available on the wireless network.  This will mitigate 
the threat if an intruder were capable of attaching to the wireless network. 
  
Strong two-factor authentication that incorporates “something you have” and “something 
you know” is used to increase the protection of the network.  Security tokens creating 
random passwords with limited lifespan and blacklisting offer good protection.  If an 
attacker were to intercept a valid user’s authentication credentials, the limited lifespan of 
the password would limit the window of time for the attacker to gain access to the 
network using the intercepted credentials, while the blacklisting prevents reuse of any 
captured credentials. 
 
The client radios will be configured to communicate with access points only, known as 
infrastructure mode.  This helps to insure that two-factor authentication and VPN 
encryption are always used.  Also, mobile devices such as laptops and tablet PCs will be 
required to have a software firewall to protect the data stored locally from attackers who 
may try probing the client devices.   
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6.3.5 Session Hijacking and Man-in-the-Middle Attacks 
 
Session hijacking allows an attacker to assume the identity of an authorized client.  With 
session hijacking, an attacker issues a disassociate command to a valid client and then 
assumes the valid client’s identity with the access point.  When the client receives the 
disassociate command, it will disconnect from the network.   
 
To implement a man-in-the-middle attack, an attacker places a rogue access point in the 
vicinity of a wireless LAN, with a stronger signal than a legitimate access point.  A client 
will then attempt to associate with the rogue access point because the signal is stronger.  
At the same time, the attacker relays all messages to the legitimate access point, 
impersonating the valid client to the legitimate access point.  At that point, the attacker 
can monitor all traffic or take over the user’s session.  
6.3.6 Session Hijacking and Man-in-the-Middle Attack Defenses 
 
Session hijacking and man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks are very difficult to implement 
against a VPN.  It is infeasible to discover a long, random VPN group key using a brute-
force or other cryptographic attack, and without the group key the attacker cannot initiate 
a session with the VPN concentrator.  Also, since man-in-the-middle attacks require 
rogue access points to be in the vicinity of the wireless LAN, rogue access point detection 
schemes will be utilized in order to identify and contain an attacker’s access point.  Once 
the attacker’s AP is contained, the MITM threat is nullified. 
6.3.7 Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks 
 
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks prevent authorized users from accessing legitimate 
services by overwhelming the network with illegitimate traffic.  DoS attacks are common 
in wired networks and can also be applied to wireless networks.  Whether intentional or 
unintentional, wireless networks can be jammed from other RF sources.  Equipment 
using the 802.11b and 802.11g standards operates in the 2.4 GHz Industrial, Scientific, 
and Medical (ISM) band.  Other RF equipment such as cordless phones, microwave 
ovens, and Bluetooth transmitters also operate in this band.  Large numbers of these 
devices can cause enough interference with the WLAN to render it inoperable.  Malicious 
jamming could also be done in order to deny service to the wireless LAN.  Equipment 
using the 802.11a standard operates in the 5 GHz frequency band.  This band is currently 
less cluttered than the 2.4 GHz band, so equipment using the 5 GHz band will typically 
receive less incidental interference from neighboring devices. 
 
A DoS attack can be performed on an access point by flooding it with association 
requests.  An access point or wireless client can be denied by saturating it with bogus 
packets.  Also, an attacker or employee can configure their client to duplicate the IP or 
MAC address of another legitimate client, causing a disruption on the network.  
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6.3.8 Denial of Service Attack Defenses 
 
The physical environment of the facilities where a wireless LAN will be deployed will be 
examined using RF auditing tools.  RF auditing tools will identify possible sources of 
interference that may interfere with the WLAN.  All RF usage at Sandia must be 
approved by the frequency coordinator.  The frequency coordinator identifies and 
investigates possible interference prior to the deployment of RF technologies.  Access 
points can be positioned and directional antennas can be used to avoid interference. 
 
An intrusion detection system could be installed on the wireless LAN to identify an 
excessive number of association requests or DHCP requests.  Excessive association or 
DHCP requests often point to a malicious attempt to deny access to the wireless network.     
 
It should be noted that denial of service attacks on the wireless LAN are not as 
destructive as the other attacks noted above.  This is because a malicious denial of service 
attack intends only to prevent access to the wireless LAN, not obtain access to the 
network or intercept sensitive information.  This must be kept in mind when determining 
what level of protection Sandia wants to deploy to defend against a denial of service 
attack. 
6.4 Wireless LAN Security Summary 
 
The wireless LAN at Sandia is implemented as a production level protected wireless 
network at Sandia that satisfies current and future customer needs for mobility and 
portability.  Wireless is treated like remote access – only a VPN with two factor 
authentication allows access to the SRN and SON, as shown in Figure 13.  In addition, no 
user services are located on the wireless network. 
 
All data transmitted across the wireless LAN is protected by a Triple-DES encrypted 
VPN.  This protects against interception and monitoring.  Rogue access point detection 
and containment will be performed in order to protect against MITM attacks and 
insertion attacks. 
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7 Rogue Detection and Containment 
 
Unauthorized (or rogue) access points are a threat to Sandia data and/or networks.  Rogue 
access points are unauthorized access points that are deployed by Sandians who do not 
know the rules regarding wireless deployment, Sandians who know the rules but decide 
to disobey them, or by malicious attackers wishing to connect to the Sandia networks or 
attract Sandia wireless clients.  In the case of the knowing or unknowing Sandian, rogue 
access points are a threat because they could provide a non-secure path to the Sandia data 
networks.  If a malicious attacker had physical access to a Sandia building, the attacker 
could connect a hidden access point to the network in order to connect to and navigate the 
Sandia network from an adjoining building or parking lot (or even further with 
specialized equipment).  An attacker may also try to lure Sandia laptops to his or her 
access point in order to attempt to steal credentials or attempt to exploit a system 
vulnerability.  The Sandia host-based firewall and anti-virus is a mitigating factor in this 
case.  Another mitigating factor for all of the threats listed above is a wireless intrusion 
detection technique called rogue access point detection and containment.  
 
Rogue access point detection is a process in which wireless sensors (air monitors) and 
access points are used to listen for 802.11 wireless signals and report the existence of 
access points to software that discerns between authorized and unauthorized access 
points.  Many systems can also report whether or not any wireless clients are connected 
to an access point. 
 
When a system detects a rogue access point, it generates a wireless intrusion detection 
alarm.  If a wireless client connects to the rogue, the system may, according to 
configuration, contain the rogue by spoofing the BSSID of the rogue access point and 
sending a very large number of deauthenticate or disassociate packets to the wireless 
client.  When this happens, all standard 802.11 wireless clients will be unable to pass 
wireless network traffic through the rogue. 
 
Both of the vendors of wireless networking infrastructure equipment selected for use at 
Sandia, Aruba Networks and Trapeze Networks, supply rogue access point detection and 
mitigation capabilities [5] [6] [21] in their products.  This could also be supplemented by 
third party, systems, such as those from AirDefense [1] or AirMagnet [3]. 
 
Extensive testing performed at Sandia has shown rogue access point detection and 
containment to be very effective in SNL wireless deployments.   To test this, the wireless 
team moved an access point considered to be a rogue by the wireless infrastructure to 
many locations within Sandia wireless-enabled buildings.  The team also used a wireless 
client to connect to the rogue access point to test rogue containment.  The client was able 
to associate with the access point, but after a few “pings” were passed from client to 
rogue access point, the containment disallowed nearly all other wireless traffic from the 
client.  The formal test results are stored in Web FileShare under the Wireless LAN Pilot 
Monthly Report documents. 
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8 Pilot Wireless LANs 
Several wireless LAN pilots were established in New Mexico and California to test 
WLAN design and equipment.  These also served to help establish policies and 
procedures. 
8.1 New Mexico Pilots 
 
Pilot wireless LANs were installed initially outside of the Limited Areas, and later, in 
close coordination with DOE/NNSA, inside Technical Area 1. 
8.1.1 Pilots Outside the Limited Area 
 
The initial pilot WLAN installations were in the medical building (831) and the trailers 
housing the medical applications developers (T53/T54/T55/MO249).  These pilot 
WLANs used the Cisco Aironet 1200 access points. 
8.1.1.1 Medical Building Pilot 
 
Wireless access in Building 831 is intended primarily for physician and support staff use 
of portable devices such as tablet PCs and PDAs.  This is a growing trend in the medical 
profession.  Doctors can have immediate access to patient information at virtually any 
location within the facility.  
 
The 831 pilot WLAN was composed of both 802.11a and 802.11b radios in order to 
study the pros and cons of each technology.  While 802.11b is very pervasive in both the 
commercial and consumer space, 802.11a is designed for greater throughput in a quieter 
frequency band (e.g. no microwave ovens), providing potentially greater performance for 
enterprise-class installations.  Wireless enabled clients in Building 831 utilized 802.11a/b 
or 802.11a/b/g interface cards, having the option to associate with either radio type (a or 
b). 
 
A site survey was conducted by the WLAN team to determine the optimum locations and 
number of Access Points (APs) for the Medical facility.  The first step was to obtain a 
building diagram, and use this to approximate the AP locations.  Then a walk-around was 
performed to determine feasibility of the preliminary AP locations.  Two constraints 
dictated the locations:  proximity to a drop box for wiring the AP to the network, and a 
suitable mounting point (preferably a ceiling location).  Drop boxes were utilized in order 
to minimize the effort required to wire the access points to the network, as this was a pilot 
implementation and changes may be necessary. 
 
The Access Point locations are shown in Figure 14.  While it is desirable to locate the 
Access Points such that coverage is optimum, the actual locations chosen are a 
compromise based on available space and proximity to drop boxes.  For example, the 
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Access Point in the far southeast corner should be located further north and east, centered 
in a hallway, however no drop boxes were available there6.  
 
Figure 14. Layout of Access Points in Bldg. 831. 
 
Figure 15 shows the security architecture for the pilot.  The architecture was designed to 
maximize security, which also minimizes the potential for unauthorized WLAN access.  
Because a wireless network extends beyond the physical boundaries that protect a wired 
network, the wireless network will be treated as a remote-access network.  As such, two-
factor authentication, and strong encryption, was required, and supplied by a VPN 
layered over the WLAN.  The VPN also overcomes the weak WLAN-native encryption 
(i.e. WEP).  However, the two can be combined to provide additional security (the 
layered approach). 
 
The architecture shown in Figure 15 was designed to isolate the WLAN from the 
remainder of the wired network and restrict access into and out of the WLAN.  The 
primary service allowed out of the WLAN is the VPN, and this access was restricted to 
the VPN concentrator only.  DHCP service is also allowed out of the WLAN, in order to 
dynamically provide IP addresses to WLAN clients.  ICMP is allowed both into and out 
of the WLAN in order to provide simple but necessary communications such as “pings” 
that help determine the health of the network.  HTTP is also allowed into the WLAN to 
allow us to remotely manage the APs. 
 
                                                          
6
 An Ethernet cable could have been run from the Access Point located in the hallway to a nearby drop box, 
but this would possibly require conduit, and certainly Facilities involvement, which was to be avoided for 
this pilot in order to maintain flexibility. 
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Figure 15. Security Architecture. 
 
With these access restrictions in place, the only path out of the WLAN was by VPN 
(except DHCP and ICMP), which is an authenticated service.  If an unauthorized 
individual gains access to the WLAN by associating with an AP from outside the 
building (as one example), that individual will have access only to the VPN concentrator, 
which is a trusted service that will only allow users that authenticate with a SecurID or 
CRYPTOCard token and PIN.  This is the same trust in the VPN concentrator that 
pertains to the Internet, where the concentrator is exposed to unauthorized connection 
attempts from anywhere in the Internet world, and is thwarted by two-factor 
identification. 
 
An additional layer of protection is the use of WEP, which while relatively easily broken, 
does send the signal that this AP is closed and not available for public access.  Any 
attempts to break into this AP are deliberate and unlawful.  (This is analogous to locking 
one’s house; a break-in is still possible by breaking a window or possibly kicking in the 
door, but at least the message is clear; this house is not open for unauthorized access, and 
any attempt to do so is against the owner’s will.)  One drawback to the use of WEP is the 
need to utilize a shared secret for generating a key. 
 
The 831 WLAN was constructed by installing an SON Ethernet switch in the 831 wiring 
closet for wiring to provide network connectivity to the WLAN.  This switch was 
purchased specifically for this project.  The switch was a Cisco 3550-24PWR, designed 
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to provide power to the Access Points using Power over Ethernet, thus avoiding having to 
run power to each Access Point.  The 3550 switch was connected to the SON backbone 
via multi-mode fiber.  Five 10/100 Ethernet ports were set to Virtual Local Area Network 
(VLAN) 91.  SON subnet 132.175.91.0 was used for the WLAN pilot.  An access control 
list (ACL) was applied to the router interface serving subnet 132.175.91.0. This ACL 
allowed IPSec and IKE traffic off of the subnet (VPN), ICMP in and out, DHCP in (for 
providing clients with an IP address), and HTTP in for managing the access points 
remotely.  A complete description of this pilot can be found in a separate white paper 
[16]. 
 
Performance and usage data was collected from tests and operation of the medical pilot 
WLAN.  Although there were some performance issues to be resolved, the 802.11a/b 
service was available and usable for access to the SRN.  Eventually the pilot WLAN was 
extended to cover trailer T13, providing access for more medical personnel. 
8.1.1.2 Medical Application Developers Pilot 
 
The other initial WLAN pilot location in New Mexico was the trailer complex housing 
the medical applications developers (T53/T54/T55/MO249).  This area was piloted so the 
software developers could have a development environment similar to the environment in 
which their applications would be operating. 
 
The network and security architectures, and equipment (Cisco 1200 APs) were the same 
as those used in the medical building pilot.  Again, usage and performance was monitored 
to collect data regarding the pilot. 
8.1.2 Pilots Inside the Limited Area 
 
Early in 2005, Sandia, NM received permission from NNSA/AL to deploy and operate 
pilot wireless LANs in three buildings inside the Limited Area for a finite period of time.  
The wireless pilot was authorized for several months, through June 25, 2005.  The 
locations permitted included all of the building where the network design and operations 
personnel are located, and conference rooms in one of the newest buildings supporting 
collaborative engineering efforts. 
 
A more complete discussion of these pilot WANs can be found in the white papers by 
Witzke [29] and Wiener [23].  After the authorized pilot period, these pilot networks 
were authorized to move to production status. 
8.2 California Pilot 
 
Starting in March of 2003, Sandia, CA began piloting a WLAN in building MO52 
located in the PPA near the northeast corner of the site.  After getting approval for a 
wireless “testbed” in MO52, two people with walkie-talkies conducted a manual site 
survey using a battery-powered AP, a laptop running the Cisco Aironet site survey utility 
(included with the old Aironet client utility software that came with a Cisco Aironet 350 
44 
series wireless NIC), and a PocketPC running AirMagnet.  We ended up deploying three 
Cisco 1200 series APs with 2 dbi omni directional antennas and the power turned most of 
the way up to cover the rather small mobile office building.  After getting the WLAN in 
MO52 up and running and several users testing it, a few additional WLAN’s were 
installed around site using the Cisco 1200 series APs.  Security was provided by a private 
SON VLAN (dedicated to the WLAN) routed to our newly installed De-Militarized Zone 
(DMZ), ACLs, a controlled DHCP server, VPN encryption, and SecurID authentication. 
 
During the spring/summer of 2003, Sandia, CA contacted Trapeze Networks to begin 
testing a WLAN switch with “dumb” APs to be located in buildings MO 50 and MO 51.  
The industry seemed to be moving away from the “smart” APs like the Cisco 1200 series 
that were not easily managed when large numbers of them began to be deployed, so it 
seemed reasonable to begin testing these new products.  Trapeze Networks, a company 
whose headquarters was less than 10 miles from Sandia, CA, was on the leading edge of 
WLAN switch/dumb AP technology, and had the author of a premier 802.11 wireless 
networking book working as the service engineer for the California Bay Area.  They were 
eager to work with Sandia; therefore it was easy to form a good business relationship 
with them quickly.  The APs installed in MO50/51 were directly connected to the 
Trapeze wireless switch since layer 3 connectivity between the AP’s and switches was 
not yet supported by Trapeze Networks.  The deployment went very smoothly and it 
became immediately clear that the planning tool part of the Trapeze management 
software (“Ringmaster”) was going to be a real time saver, over doing a traditional site 
survey to determine where to place APs and at what power and channel to set them.  It 
was at about this time that Sandia, NM and Sandia, CA began working together to share 
lessons learned and formed the wireless networking project team.  The Sandia, CA 
networking department had access to some year-end funds and purchased the equipment 
that Trapeze Networks had loaned to Sandia, CA for the MO50/51 pilot, as well as some 
additional hardware.  After purchasing the Trapeze Networks equipment in the summer 
of 2003, Sandia, CA began deploying it in favor of the Cisco 1200 series equipment and 
eventually replaced all the Cisco APs that had been deployed, with Trapeze APs.  
Officially, it was during the spring of 2004 that the WLAN pilot ended but at Sandia, CA 
the pilot was treated more like a production network from the start since they were being 
supported by production networking department personnel from the time of initial 
installation. 
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9 Wireless LAN Equipment Selection and Acquisition 
 
At SNL/NM facility a “best value” type procurement was used.  In this type of 
procurement, although price is not included among the ranked criteria, it is evaluated.  
The best overall value is determined by comparing differences based on the offeror’s 
relative capabilities and price/cost in relation to all other offers received.  In a best value 
procurement, Sandia might not award the contract to the vendor offering the lowest price; 
award may be made to a responsible offeror whose proposal offers a greater value. 
 
The statement of work for this Request for Quotation (RFQ) read as follows: 
Contractor shall provide the following, on an as-needed basis, to Sandia 
National Laboratories: Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) 
infrastructure equipment; wireless switches and appliances; tri-mode dual 
band 802.11 a/b/g/ access points; management, control, diagnostic, and 
monitoring software; site survey software, and hardware/software 
maintenance. 
 
The mandatory requirements were as stated: 
The system proposed shall include access points and appliances to support 
up to 2000 simultaneous users in a secure, reliable, and maintainable 
manner.  Provide a description of how the proposed system will meet all of 
the mandatory requirements listed below.  The system proposed shall meet 
or exceed the following mandatory performance requirements. 
 
Experience 
• Minimum of one (1) year experience providing Wireless Local Area 
Networks 
• Provide examples of major systems installed and operating 
 
Performance 
• Layer 2/Layer 3 roaming (layer 2 – ability to seamlessly roam from 
AP to AP within a subnet; layer 3 – ability to seamlessly roam from 
AP to AP across subnets) 
 
System Architecture 
• Switched architecture (AP switch) and support routed AP appliances 
• Support simultaneous tri-mode, dual-band AP (802.11a/b/g) 
 
System Security 
• Multi-channel rogue AP detection (the ability to detect and report an 
unauthorized AP) while simultaneously serving clients 
• Rogue AP containment (the ability to prevent an unauthorized AP from 
accepting connections from WLAN clients) 
• Client authentication (WEP, WPA-PSK, and 802.1x) 
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• Layer 2 encryption (WEP, WPA, and AES) 
• Layer 3 VPN (IPSec) pass through compatibility 
• No security-significant information (encryption keys, Radius shared 
secrets) stored on an AP after removal of power 
 
System Management 
• Performance and diagnostic monitoring (at a minimum, throughput 
and associations through graphs or text reports) 
• Integrated management (all APs, switches, and appliances can be 
managed and monitored from a central point) 
• SNMP v2 monitoring 
• Policy management (the ability to assign security, Quality of Service, 
and VLAN attributes to a group or individual) 
• Dynamic AP power and channel management 
• Integrated site survey tool (including the ability to import graphical 
representations of building floors) 
 
Electrical Power 
• A system that has the AP’s powered by Power Over Ethernet (PoE) 
according to the 802.3af specification 
 
Standards 
• Wi-Fi Certified (802.11a/b/g) support 
• Plenum-rated AP 
 
The evaluation criteria included the following features and factors: 
 
• Wireless Intrusion Detection (WIDS) 
• FIPS 140-2 Certification of Cryptographic Modules 
• MAC Address-Based Authentication 
• Packet Capture of Wireless Packets 
• IGMP Processing on Wireless Switches 
• Discovery Protocol (Compatible with Cisco’s CDP) 
• SNMP v3 monitoring 
• Reliability and Maintenance Concept 
• Security Featurs and Capabilities 
• Availability/Delivery Schedule – provide delivery schedule for proposed units 
• Maintenance Plans Available 
• Availablity of Training for SNL Personnel 
 
After the responses were evaluated, the contract was let to Network Presence, LLC to 
supply equipment from Aruba Networks.  The initial order was received in September 
2004.  Aruba Network wireless LAN equipment was first installed at Sandia, NM later 
that month, in September 2004, replacing equipment from the Cisco pilot installation in 
medical (buildings 831 and T-13). 
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In the late summer of 2004, Sandia, CA purchased about $92K worth of WLAN 
equipment from Trapeze Networks.  The order consisted of a combination of APs, 
wireless switches, PoE injectors, external directional antennas, and associated 
maintenance.  The order was placed through purchasing as a sole source based on the fact 
that the new equipment needed to be compatible with existing equipment.  The 
equipment was received shortly after the order was placed. 
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10 WLAN Deployment 
 
Following the prototypes, plans were made for enterprise-wide deployment of Wireless 
LAN technology.  Deployment started in buildings outside of the Limited Areas, and 
once approved by NNSA, continued with buildings inside the Limited Areas. 
10.1 NWIS Entries for Aruba Access Points 
 
The naming convention provided by Computer Security is based on the RTIW form for 
each wireless installation.  For NM, each RTIW is designated with a name in the form of 
nmwxxx, where “nm” refers to New Mexico, the “w” refers to wireless, and the “xxx” is 
the serial number of the RTIW.  Each access point for a particular RTIW will be 
consecutively numbered as a “-xx” following the RTIW designator.  For example, the 
medical installation at NM is designated “nmw002”.  Each access point for “nmw002” is 
named “nmw002-01”, “nmw002-02, etc. This technique allows Computer Security to run 
reports on wireless installations for auditing purposes. 
 
Figure 16 shows the access point basic information, such as name, owner, location, 
manufacturer, etc.  The vendor serial number is entered as the Aruba location ID, such as 
1.1.1.  The model AP-52 is entered in the “or other Model” field.  The OS is entered as 
“boot system file” because this was the closest match, and the OS version is entered as 
“unknown” since there is no match for the Aruba version and we don’t really care to 
track the version number here. 
 
 
Figure 16. Access Point Information. 
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Figure 17 shows the interface cards and IP address for this AP. Each radio has its own 
interface and hardware address in addition to the wired interface.  
 
 
Figure 17. Access Point Interface and IP Information. 
 
There will also be an alias listed in NWIS that gives a “traditional” Sandia name to the 
access point.  The alias will incorporate the location (e.g. SA, for Sandia Albuquerque), 
the equipment manufacturer (e.g. AW, for Aruba Wireless Networks), the equipment 
type (e.g. 9, for an access point), the VLAN number, and the AP number within that 
VLAN.  If this were the first access point on VLAN 91, the alias in NWIS would be 
SAAW99101.sandia.gov. 
10.2 NWIS Entries for Trapeze Access Points 
 
At SNL/CA, the Trapeze Networks access points are registered in NWIS the same as at 
SNL/NM but with a few minor differences.  First, the prefixes of SNL/CA access points 
begin with “caw” (California wireless) instead of “nmw”.  Then, the “caw” prefix is 
followed by the serial number of the RTIW.  Next, the building number is placed in the 
machine name, followed lastly by the particular access point number.  The access points 
end up with a name like “caw016-916-1”.  The NWIS access point entries also contain 
detailed information concerning the location, serial number, model number, 
manufacturer, etc. 
 
After entering the access point name and detailed information, the unique hardware 
addresses of the access point are entered into the NWIS record.  For each Trapeze 
Networks access point, there will be at least four hardware addresses registered — one 
for each of the two wired Ethernet interfaces and one for each of the two radios (802.11a 
and 802.11b/g) for each SSID the access point services.  The SNL/CA access points 
utilize DHCP for IP address assignment, so the “DHCP Enable” field will be set to 
DHCP (dynamic) for the Ethernet interfaces. 
 
50 
10.3 Site Survey Methodology 
 
A WLAN site survey is the process of determining how many AP’s will be needed for the 
desired WLAN site, where to place the AP’s in the proposed area, how the AP’s should 
be configured, and if there are any RF obstacles or noise sources that will need special 
attention.  Following are the methods used to conduct a WLAN site survey at the Sandia 
California and New Mexico facilities. 
10.3.1 California 
 
SNL/CA WLAN site surveys should be conducted using a combination of a visual survey 
of the WLAN site, interviews with WLAN site customers to determine usage needs and 
locations, an automated RF planning tool to speed up the survey process, a battery 
powered access point and RF measurement tool for verification, and a comprehensive 
WLAN survey, security, and performance monitoring tool such as the AirMagnet 
product. 
10.3.1.1 WLAN Customer Interviews 
 
Interviewing the customers of a proposed WLAN site (sometimes called a “Pre Site 
Survey”) is very important and should be the first step of any WLAN design.  At a 
minimum, the WLAN designer needs to know how many customers will use the WLAN 
and at what times, what type of data throughput do the customers expect or need, if there 
are any special considerations (e.g. proximity to classified processing or safety 
considerations), the physical size and construction of the proposed WLAN area, and the 
potential for a future increase of users or remodel of the WLAN area.  By completing an 
accurate pre site survey, the customer can reduce the likelihood that the WLAN will have 
to be redesigned in the near future and save the WLAN designer time in the initial design. 
10.3.1.2 Visual Survey 
 
A visual survey is simply the process of an experienced WLAN designer walking around 
the proposed WLAN site, verifying the information from the pre site survey and filling in 
any gaps of information that the customer might have inadvertently left off.  A visual 
survey will also give the designer an opportunity to determine the type of construction, 
investigate any special areas (e.g. lead walls in a radiology lab would wreak havoc with 
RF propagation), and make distance measurements of the WLAN area and the proximity 
to the nearest buildings and/or classified processing areas.  If the area is unfamiliar to the 
designer, then a WLAN analyzer tool (e.g. AirMagnet) will be useful to determine if 
there are any other WLAN’s operating in the vicinity that may cause interference. 
10.3.1.3 RF Planning Tools 
 
A good WLAN RF planning tool can save the site surveyor much time and shoe tread but 
must be used in conjunction with an RF monitoring tool for verification.  An RF planning 
tool is a computer program whose input is an electronic drawing of the building or area 
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where the WLAN will be installed, as well as information as to the construction of the 
building (e.g. are the walls concrete or wood).  Other parameters include the number of 
users in the area and the expected data throughput.  The output is a drawing of where the 
APs should be placed and how they should be configured (i.e. channel and power 
settings).  Until such time the WLAN designer has acquired sufficient experience using a 
particular planning tool, the placement of APs should be verified.  This is accomplished 
by using a battery powered AP, placing it in the various locations specified by the 
planning tool, and verifying that the RF coverage is sufficient for the customer needs. 
10.3.1.4 Traditional WLAN Site Survey 
 
Until recently when RF planning tools have become more prevalent, the common method 
for a WLAN site survey was the use of a battery powered AP and an RF measuring tool 
to map the coverage of a proposed WLAN area.  The site surveyor would move the AP 
around the site and meticulously record RF measurements from a measurement tool.  
This tool was usually just a laptop with a wireless NIC that had a site survey utility to 
allow raw RF measurements.  After hours or days of measurements, the site surveyors 
would complete their measurements and know where to place the APs and at which 
channels and what power level to set them.  The advent of RF planning tools has saved 
WLAN designers much time in the site survey process but the traditional method is still 
the most accurate and should be used for verification of the output from the RF planning 
tool.  It shouldn’t take too long to go back and make some measurements to verify what 
the planning tool has indicated.  It will save time and money in rewiring a building if the 
APs need to be moved significantly from the location indicated by the RF planning tool if 
it is wrong or if the designer input faulty data into the planning tool. 
10.3.1.5 AP/User Ratio 
 
If the WLAN designer uses a good RF planning tool, the tool will “ask” for the number 
of users and a minimum baseline throughput, then calculate the number of APs 
accordingly.  The SNL/CA facility is guided by the thought that there should be no more 
than 20-30 users to one AP.  An over subscription ratio might also be factored in to 
account for the fact that not all the users will be using the WLAN at the same time.  At 
Sandia, users are accustomed to a high level of service on the wired network; therefore 
the WLAN should be designed with a lower user-to-AP ratio—probably somewhere 
between 10 to 20 users per AP. 
10.3.2 New Mexico 
 
The SNL/NM Site Survey methodology is much like that used at SNL/CA, with one 
major difference.  SNL/NM is employing a “dense AP” or grid technique, whereby a 
fairly large number of APs are deployed in an area to ensure coverage without an 
extensive site survey or fine tuning of AP placement. 
 
Prior to deployment, SNL/NM employs the same first two steps as SNL/CA: WLAN 
Customer Interviews and Visual Survey.  The interviews and visual surveys are essential 
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to ensure that customer expectations are met, and that the physical aspects of the 
installation are understood before attempting a design. 
 
The RF planning stage is where SNL/NM diverges from the SNL/CA technique.  
SNL/NM uses equipment from Aruba Networks.  Aruba’s technique is to lay out APs at 
some relatively small interval such as 50 ft, forming a grid over the building.  This dense 
deployment does not take into account any localized concerns like particular walls or 
other RF obstructions.  Using a diagram of a building, the Aruba survey tool recommends 
locations for AP, and these locations can be adjusted to take into account the physical 
aspects of the building.  Once the APs are deployed, they are automatically tuned (power 
and channel) to take into account the localized conditions.  Where an AP is not covering 
well, its power might be increased.  Where an AP is covering well, its power might be 
reduced.  The same goes for channel assignments.  Once the building is operational, the 
system is checked using wireless clients and a measurement tool such as AirMagnet. 
 
This makes for a very simple deployment method compared to the traditional painstaking 
AP placement and measurement technique, or the automated technique that takes into 
account building materials and obstructions, or the absolutely efficient placement of APs.  
There is a downside to the grid technique: many APs.  The design is not engineered for 
greatest efficiency (in terms of AP placement and coverage) or minimum equipment cost.  
However, this approach minimizes the likelihood of a redesign or having to add more 
APs to accommodate growth.  Additionally, the money saved on the detailed site survey 
covers a significant portion of the cost of the extra access points. 
 
Figure 18 shows a snapshot of a plan for a single-story building.  The east end of the 
building does not require coverage; therefore there are no APs in this area. 
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Figure 18. Aruba Site Survey Tool. 
 
10.4 Wireless Network Design 
 
Wireless system design activities begin with an assessment of a customer request for 
services.  Preliminary research, such as a visual inspection of the area, and conceptual 
system data are considered.  A list of questions to determine customer needs and 
requirements is compiled.  A project meeting or customer interview is scheduled to 
obtain and document responses to the above mentioned questions.  Data gathered at this 
meeting will include but not be limited to the following: 
 Operational results required and expected; 
 System performance expectations; 
 Vendor equipment preferences (if any); 
 Project Timeline requirements; 
 Budgetary issues and concerns; 
 Documentation and process expectations. 
Upon completion of the customer interview, response data is evaluated and the 
foundational engineering document (Customer Requirements) is prepared and submitted 
to the customer for review and solicitation of any change suggestions. 
 
After completion of the Customer Requirements document, conceptual design work 
begins.  Technology, vendor platform, and performance testing and network architecture 
data and considerations are studied and analyzed.  Additional APs are included, to be 
placed in monitoring mode and serve as detection points for rogue access points and other 
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wireless intruders.  A conceptual design is then prepared and submitted for peer review.  
During the peer review, an assessment of design concept viability is made and peer 
suggestions and input are documented. 
 
Next, production design work begins.  The production network design is prepared 
addressing all system deployment, network integration and architectural considerations 
and concerns adhering to ISO processes and “engineering best practices.”  A final 
production design review is conducted and peer endorsement is obtained.  At this point 
the design documents are placed and posted in appropriate document resource data bases 
and delivered to tier2 or network infrastructure contractors for execution of the 
implementation activities. 
10.5 Installation Issues 
 
Several issues related to installation of the access points needed to be resolved during this 
project.  One dealt with whether the APs should be visible (below the ceiling) or hidden 
(above the ceiling).  Another dealt with power to the APs.  To maintain flexibility in 
these decisions the team requested that the APs be Plenum-rated and that they support the 
IEEE Power over Ethernet specification. 
 
Hiding the APs may make installation easier and reduces the possibility of theft of the 
APs.  Making the APs visible allows a user to easily determine that wireless coverage 
might be available in a given area.  Seeing the APs also provide a visual cue to people 
regarding the usage of wireless transmissions and the security precautions they may need 
to take.  The project personnel decided to mount the APs below the ceiling, where they 
are visible. 
 
Power could be delivered to the APs over the network cable (PoE, or Power over 
Ethernet, the IEEE 802.3af specification) or through an externally connected power 
supply.  If the APs were installed above the ceiling, it would be easy to connect an 
external power supply to them, if the were close enough to a power outlet.  If not 
additional power cabling would need to be installed.  If the APs were installed below the 
ceiling, powering them with external power cables may prove very awkward, and PoE 
would likely be much more convenient.  The project personnel decided to use PoE.  If for 
any reason the communication switch to which the AP was connected could not supply 
the required power, an external power supply could be plugged into an electrical outlet 
and power could be put onto the network cable via a power injector. 
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11 Conclusions 
 
Sandia National Laboratories can in some ways be considered an early adopter of 
wireless LAN technology.  Although Sandia was not among the very first large 
enterprises in industry to use wireless LANs, they were the first Nuclear Weapons 
Complex (NWC) lab or plant to deploy production wireless infrastructure in exclusion 
areas.  Sandia was also an early adopter of the thin AP type solutions (sections 2.3-2.5). 
 
Sandia developed a staff of well-trained wireless networking personnel over the course of 
this project, whose skills and knowledge were assembled from a combination of formal 
training and project experience.  Lessons were learned along the way and a path forward 
into the future was charted. 
11.1 Lessons Learned 
 
Specific lessons learned on this project include: 
o Keep communication lines open with all interested parties, but especially those in 
the security fields (e.g. cyber security, local NNSA office, etc.).  Our frequent 
communications with various security personnel smoothed the path towards 
wireless LAN deployment in the exclusion areas. 
o Keep the users informed at all times regarding security rules during the piloting 
and deployment of new technologies.  Sometimes rules change or vary somewhat 
between the pilot and production phases, base on information, experience, or 
knowledge gained from the pilot.  To make the project a success, we had to help 
users steer clear of security infractions. 
o Continue to work towards a sustainable, long term process for the deployment of 
new technologies.  On this project the development team focused heavily on the 
technology, while not putting enough emphasis on production operation 
procedures. 
o Work closely with other laboratories and plants.  Sharing information and 
experience can maximize efforts. 
11.2 Future Directions 
 
Future directions for this project, along with continuing to expand the production wireless 
LAN, should include monitoring technology advances and evaluating their potential for 
improving wireless networking at Sandia.  Two specific technologies, 802.11i and Wi-
Max, are covered in more detail later in this section.  802.11i should be deployed at 
Sandia in accordance with DoD and NIST recommendations.  Wi-Max technology should 
be monitored as it matures, for possible use in certain applications at Sandia, as noted in 
section 11.2.2.1. 
 
Other technologies such as wireless USB and ultra wideband technology should be 
monitored for their possible application to efforts at Sandia.  Higher speed standards, 
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such as 802.11n, should be tracked as possible paths forward to higher throughput in 
Sandia’s wireless LAN.  Wireless Wide Area Network (WWAN) technology, such as the 
cellular telephone data technologies (e.g. EV-DO, EDGE), should be monitored for 
application to, and integration with Sandia’s wireless LAN infrastructure.  Wireless voice 
over IP (VoIP) should be investigated for potential use at Sandia, particularly in 
exclusion areas where there is WLAN coverage. 
11.2.1 IEEE 802.11i7 
 
IEEE 802.11i is a standard approved by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics 
Engineers in the 802.11 series, concerning wireless LANs.  Amendment 6, 802.11i, deals 
with medium access control (MAC) security enhancements.  The IEEE 802.11i standard 
specifies a new generation of security measures for wireless LANs, to remedy the 
security shortcomings of the earlier 802.11 standards. 
11.2.1.1 Current Conditions at SNL 
 
Sandia National Laboratories instituted wireless networking at the New Mexico and 
California sites over the past two years.  Due to the limitations of wireless security 
standards at the time of deployment, the system was designed to use non-authenticated 
wireless access, with authentication control and data privacy applied through use of a 
layered VPN, which supplied two-factor authentication, data encryption, and data 
integrity. 
 
While this was an acceptable security solution, it was far from ideal.  Because there is no 
authentication for the wireless system itself, it is possible for non-authorized persons to 
connect to the system.  For this reason, the system was built on an isolated, open 
infrastructure having no direct access to the internal network.  Access to the internal 
network is possible only through the authenticated VPN. 
 
Ideally, the wireless system itself should require mutual authentication between the user 
and the wireless system, and provide strong encryption, rather than having to rely on a 
layered VPN that provides only one-way authentication, impacts performance, and 
complicates the system.  With the advent of IEEE 802.11i, this is possible.  With 802.11i, 
a wireless system can utilize a number of strong authentication protocols based around 
the EAP protocol.  Data privacy is provided either by the strong encryption standard, 
AES, or a backward compatible, improved version of WEP called TKIP.  These elements 
provide a system that is strong yet usable. 
 
Additionally, 802.11i is compatible with smart cards, which are being adopted by Sandia 
for user authentication in place of reusable passwords.  With the user already 
authenticated at time of machine login using a smart card, attachment to the wireless 
system can be accomplished using the same credential (digital certificate) without 
additional user interaction. 
                                                          
7
 Major portions of this section were excerpted from the whitepaper, “A Recommendation for the Use of 
802.11i with Sandia National Laboratories’ Enterprise Wireless Network” [15] 
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11.2.1.2 802.11i Evaluation 
 
802.11i defines two new types of wireless networks called Robust Security Network 
(RSN) and Transitional Security Network (TSN).  A true RSN allows only RSN-capable 
devices to connect and requires devices to support a number of new functionalities over 
the old Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) standard.  However, because many people will 
want to upgrade hardware over a period of time and use pre-RSN equipment during the 
upgrade, the 802.11i standard also defines a TSN in which both RSN and WEP systems 
can operate in parallel. 
 
When the security flaws with WEP began to surface, the major Wi-Fi manufacturers 
decided that security was so important to users that it had to move as fast as possible to 
create a replacement for WEP.  Furthermore, they realized customers would not replace 
all their existing Wi-Fi equipment in order to switch to RSN.  The Wi-Fi Alliance 
adopted a new security standard called Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA). This standard is a 
subset of the RSN draft, which only includes parts of RSN that legacy WEP hardware 
could support with a simple software upgrade.  Once the 802.11i standard was accepted, 
the Wi-Fi Alliance implemented a WPA2 certification process to ensure all WPA2 
certified Wi-Fi equipment is 802.11i compliant8. 
 
Confidentiality, integrity, mutual authentication, and availability are important issues for 
wireless LAN security.  The integrity of all messages must be ensured, but we can split 
the problems of confidentiality and mutual authentication into two separate sections.  We 
will deal with authentication in a wireless network first. 
11.2.1.3 Authentication Using 802.1X and EAP 
 
Two authentication mechanisms are possible in the 802.11i specification.  In one 
mechanism, the possession of a Pre-Shared Key (PSK) authenticates the peers.  A 128-bit 
encryption key and another distinct 64-bit Message Integrity Code (MIC) can be derived 
from the PSK.  This mechanism, using a static key distribution, is intended for smaller 
organizations, thereby incurring a high management overhead cost for larger 
organizations. 
 
Authentication and key management can also be handled by a combination of 802.1X and 
EAP (Extensible Authentication Protocol).  IEEE 802.1X is a port-based network access 
control framework. Initial 802.1X communications begin with an unauthenticated 
supplicant (i.e., client device) attempting to connect with an authenticator (i.e., 802.11 
access point).  The access point responds by enabling a port for passing only EAP packets 
from the client to an authentication server located on the wired side of the access point. 
The access point blocks all other traffic, such as HTTP, DHCP, and POP3 packets, until 
the access point can verify the client's identity using an authentication server (e.g., 
RADIUS).  Once authenticated, the access point opens the client's port for other types of 
                                                          
8
 Note that in this document, WPA2 is used interchangeably with 802.11i. There are in fact some minor 
differences between WPA2 and 802.11i, but those differences do not come into play in the context of this 
report. 
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traffic.  Mutual authentication of both the access point and the client is important because 
man in the middle (MITM) attacks are possible when only one party in the 
communication is authenticated. 
 
The Wi-Fi Alliance’s WPA standard defined two authentication mechanisms.  The first, 
WPA-Personal, includes WPA-PSK (pre-shared key).  This is a simpler version that does 
not support 802.1X or a separate RADIUS server for mutual authentication.  The second 
WPA authentication mechanism, WPA-Enterprise, includes all of the features of WPA-
PSK plus support for 802.1X RADIUS authentication and is appropriate in those cases 
where a RADIUS server is deployed. 
11.2.1.3.1 EAP 
 
EAP defines a set of messages that are used to make the introductions between the 
supplicant and authenticator and to allow mutual authentication.  These messages are 
used with a number of upper-layer authentication methods.  The RFC defining EAP, 
which is only nine pages excluding references and acknowledgments, defines only four 
different messages: request, response, failure, and success.  It is a lightweight protocol 
with the meat being the specific authentication methods.  EAP also allows two parties to 
exchange information that is specific to the authentication method they want to use.  The 
content of these authentication-specific methods is not defined in EAP.  In fact, they can 
be completely proprietary authentication methods or newly invented ones.  EAP’s ability 
to handle part of the communication in a standardized way and part in a specific way is 
the key to its extensibility. 
 
A number of RFCs have been written detailing how to use EAP with specific 
authentication methods.  For example, there is an RFC specifying how to use Transport 
Layer Security (TLS) over EAP (EAP-TLS), another draft stating how to use Tunneled 
TLS (TTLS) over EAP (EAP-TTLS), one describing Protected EAP (EAP-PEAP), and 
many other RFCs detailing authentication methods. 
 
Three TLS-based protocols have been developed for use with EAP and are suitable for 
deployments in wireless LANs.  The TLS protocol, which is described in IETF RFC-
2246, is based on the SSL 3.0 Protocol Specification as published by Netscape.  Full TLS 
includes authentication and confidentiality; however RSN and Wi-Fi Protected Access 
(WPA) use only the authentication portion of TLS relying on a separate protocol for 
confidentiality.  The TLS authentication method uses asymmetric cryptography, in the 
form of digital certificates, to authenticate both parties and fits well into the EAP/IEEE 
802.1X framework. 
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11.2.1.3.2 EAP-TLS  
 
EAP-TLS uses a TLS handshake as the basis for authentication. It is well documented 
and has been analyzed quite extensively.  Study of the protocol has not yet revealed 
significant weaknesses in the protocol itself.  (Several implementations have suffered 
from bugs, however.) 
 
TLS authenticates peers using digital certificates.  In EAP-TLS certificates are used to 
authenticate in both directions.  The server presents encrypted information along with a 
certificate to the client, and after proving the server's possession of the private key 
associated with the validated certificate, the client presents a similar packet to the server.  
Naturally, the certificate may be protected on the client by a pass phrase or PIN, or stored 
on a smartcard, depending on the implementation.  One flaw in the EAP-TLS protocol, 
noted by many observers, is that the identity exchange proceeds in the clear before the 
exchange is encrypted, so a passive attack could easily observe user names. 
 
Digital certificates are the Achilles heel of EAP-TLS.  The use of certificate 
authentication of clients mandates a concurrent or previous PKI rollout.  If you do not 
already have a PKI in place, the additional work involved in issuing and managing 
certificates is quite large.  In comparison with other PKI-enabled protocols, EAP-TLS 
may impose a greater certificate management overhead because of the need to revoke 
certificates as users have wireless LAN access revoked. 
 
The bottom line is that EAP-TLS is secure, but the requirement for client certificates is 
too large of a hurdle for most institutions.  Fortunately, Sandia already has a PKI in place. 
11.2.1.3.3 EAP-TTLS and PEAP  
 
Both EAP-TTLS and PEAP were developed in response to the PKI barrier in EAP-TLS.  
Client certificates are not ideal for user authentication for a variety of reasons.  Other 
methods of user authentication are as secure as certificate-based authentication but 
without the high management overhead.  Both EAP-TTLS and PEAP were designed to 
use established authentication mechanisms while retaining the strong cryptographic 
foundation of TLS. 
 
The structure of EAP-TTLS and PEAP are quite similar.  Both are two-stage protocols 
that establish security in stage one and then exchange authentication in stage two.  Stage 
one of both protocols establishes a TLS tunnel and authenticates the authentication server 
to the client with a certificate.  (EAP-TTLS and PEAP still use certificates to authenticate 
the wireless network to the user, but only a few certificates will be required, so it is much 
more manageable.)  Once that secure channel has been established, client authentication 
credentials are exchanged in the second stage. 
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EAP-TTLS uses the TLS channel to exchange "attribute-value pairs" (AVPs), much like 
RADIUS.  (In fact, the AVP encoding format is very similar to RADIUS.)  The general 
encoding of information allows an EAP-TTLS server to validate AVPs against any type 
of authentication mechanism.  EAP-TTLS implementations today support all methods 
defined by EAP, as well as several older methods (e.g. CHAP, PAP, MS-CHAP and MS-
CHAPv2).  EAP-TTLS can easily be extended to work with new protocols by defining 
new attributes to support new protocols. 
 
PEAP uses the TLS channel to protect a second EAP exchange.  Authentication must be 
performed using a protocol that is defined for use with EAP.  In practice, the restriction to 
EAP methods is not a severe drawback because any "important" authentication protocol 
would be defined for use with EAP in short order so that PEAP could use it.  So far 
Microsoft has been a big proponent of the PEAP standard, leaving EAP-TTLS support in 
Windows to third party vendors. 
 
EAP-TTLS and PEAP are extremely similar, however there are some differences 
between the two that we outline below: 
o Both EAP-TTLS and PEAP set up a TLS session for the first round of authentication. 
o EAP-TTLS exchanges "attribute-value pairs" (typically with a RADIUS server) 
inside the TLS tunnel. 
o PEAP performs a second EAP session inside the TLS tunnel. 
11.2.1.3.4 Conclusions on Authentication 
 
Selection of an authentication method is the key decision in securing a wireless LAN 
deployment.  The authentication method drives the choice of authentication server, which 
in turn drives the choice of client software.  Fortunately, selecting an authentication 
method compatible with 802.11i is a reasonably straightforward endeavor.  The static key 
distribution solution of PSK is not feasible unless the organization is extremely small.  
Unless you have a well-oiled PKI already deployed, bypass EAP-TLS to avoid the client 
certificate headaches.  Though there is not a large technical difference between the EAP-
TTLS and PEAP protocols, EAP-TTLS has a number of minor advantages.  In addition to 
a moderate degree of flexibility at the protocol level, both open source and commercial 
EAP-TTLS products are now available supporting a much wider variety of client 
operating systems. 
 
An important point to keep in mind is that man-in-the-middle attacks are possible, as 
pointed out in the EAP working group draft “The Compound Authentication Binding 
Problem”, when one-way authenticated tunnels are used to protect communications of 
one or a sequence of authentication methods.  For this reason mutual authentication must 
be done at every phase of the authentication process. 
11.2.1.4 Confidentiality 
 
The 802.11i standard includes two link-layer encryption protocols.  The first, Temporal 
Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP) was designed to work on pre-802.11i hardware.  The 
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second, Counter Mode/CBC-MAC Protocol (CCMP) using Advanced Encryption 
Standard (AES), was designed from the ground up to offer the highest level of security 
possible. 
11.2.1.4.1 TKIP 
 
Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP) exists for one reason: to allow legacy WEP 
systems to upgrade their security.  This is the reason TKIP was created, and this 
requirement guided the design throughout the standardization process [10].  TKIP is 
based on the RC4 stream cipher -- the same as WEP.  TKIP however provides important 
data encryption enhancements including a per-packet key mixing function, a message 
integrity check (MIC) named Michael, an extended initialization vector (IV) with 
sequencing rules, and a re-keying mechanism.  Through these enhancements, TKIP 
addresses all of WEP’s known vulnerabilities.  
 
However, weakness is predestined due to the limitation of re-using legacy hardware.  
Although the TKIP key mixing function has stronger security than the WEP key 
scheduling algorithm, it is possible to find the MIC key given one of the per-packet keys 
and its corresponding packet.  Furthermore, security is broken for the duration of a 
Temporal Key (TK), if two different per-packet keys are discovered having the same IV.  
Finally, the Michael algorithm provides only 20 bits of security, which means that an 
attacker can forge a packet after 219 attempts, on average. 
11.2.1.4.2 CCMP 
 
To provide confidentiality CCMP uses AES in counter mode.  For integrity, CCMP uses 
Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code (CBC-MAC).  This cipher 
provides the best security currently available in commercial products.  In addition, CCMP 
protects some fields that were not previously encrypted.  The additional parts of the IEEE 
802.11 frame that get protected are known as additional authentication data (AAD).  
AAD includes the packet’s source and destination addresses.  This protects against 
attackers replaying packets to different destinations. 
11.2.1.4.3 Conclusions on Confidentiality 
 
The vulnerabilities pointed out above do not mean that TKIP is insecure, only individual 
parts are weak.  However, these weaknesses show that TKIP was built upon a weak 
foundation, and could lead to the discovery of vulnerabilities in TKIP.  It is 
recommended that any organization that does not have legacy WEP hardware deployed 
or that requires a high level of security, should only allow AES-CCMP devices to 
connect to their RSNs.  Transitional networks should deploy both TKIP and CCMP 
encryption with a plan to migrate all users to CCMP in the future. 
62 
 
11.2.1.5 802.11i Conclusions 
 
Although Sandia National Laboratories’ current wireless system is deemed safe, it does 
not protect against unauthorized associations and relies entirely on a layered VPN 
solution for protection, which impacts performance and adds complexity.  With the 
advent of 802.11i, the wireless network can be protected to the highest degree current 
commercial technology allows without impacting performance, and sets the stage for 
potential removal of the layered VPN. Initial implementation of 802.11i will most 
certainly be hampered by client configuration issues and software problems, but the 
advantages far outweigh the challenges that will be encountered. With the removal of the 
overlay VPN (assuming eventual approval), there will be a single, integrated system 
rather than a wireless system and a layered VPN system. 
11.2.2 Wi-Max 
 
WiMax is a broadband wireless Metropolitan Area Network (MAN) technology that fits 
between wireless LANs (such as 802.11) and wireless WANs (such as those based on 
cellular networks).  WiMax can serve as a backhaul for cellular systems and Wi-Fi hot 
spots, and as a “last 100 meter access” solution for residential and business broadband 
services.  WiMax will face stiff competition in the United States from DSL and cable 
providers, but regions such as South America and parts of Asia will likely welcome 
wireless broadband [30]. 
 
WiMax carries IP (Internet Protocol) and provides fixed or portable (but not mobile) 
wireless solutions.  (The distinction between portability and mobility has been discussed 
elsewhere [28].)  It can be used at rates between 40 and 72 Mbps at ranges up to 5-15 
miles.  The point-to-point mode of WiMax may even be usable up to 50 miles.  It can 
integrate into both 3rd generation (3G) mobile networks and wireline networks. 
 
WiMax is defined by the IEEE 802.16d (also known as 802.16-2004) standard.  This is 
based upon and improves on the 802.16 and 802.16a standards.  An additional standard 
(802.16e) is in progress to support mobility, but the first WiMax deployments will be 
fixed point to fixed multi-point. 
 
There are many frequency bands where WiMax could be implemented, but the three 
areas where initial WiMax implementations are focused are the 3.5 GHz licensed band 
(300 MHz of spectrum bandwidth from 3.3 to 3.6 GHz), the MMDS bands (licensed 
spectrum at 2.500-2.690 GHz and 2.700-2.900 GHz), and the unlicensed 5.8 GHZ band 
(Upper Unlicensed National Information Infrastructure – U-NII – band, 5.725-5.850 
GHz).  Some cordless telephone systems use the 5.8 GHz Upper U-NII band so local 
interference problems may occur, as with 802.11b/g and the cordless phones that operate 
in the 2.4 GHz ISM (Industrial, Scientific, and Medical) band. 
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Security is built into WiMax with PKI certificate-based encryption.  Ramana Mylavarapu 
points out [17] that there are many potential vulnerabilities in WiMax.  Time will tell 
how many of these vulnerabilities are practical. 
 
There are very few WiMax products on the market at this point.  Most are still under 
development.  It was expected that long-distance carriers like AT&T and MCI would use 
WiMax to bypass local service provider networks [14], but now that both of these 
companies (which are the two largest long-distance providers in the United States) are 
being acquired by local phone companies, their enthusiasm for WiMax may decrease. 
 
 
11.2.2.1 WiMax Recommendation 
 
At this point Sandia should not be in a hurry to adopt WiMax.  Currently Sandia does not 
have a compelling need for the point-to-multipoint “last 100 meter” capabilities that 
WiMax provides.  Sandia currently has wireless bridging technology in place (although 
WiMax might be able to provide greater bandwidth) where point-to-point backhaul 
solutions are needed.  WiMax, being a new technology that has not yet had a “trial by 
fire”, will need some time for the user community to expose security holes and for the 
vendors to repair the flaws. 
 
Sandia should monitor the development of WiMax.  As the technology and standards 
mature, Sandia should re-evaluate possible uses of WiMax, especially for wireless 
bridging applications.  When the standard for mobility has been completed and 
implemented, Sandia can revisit WiMax in light of their current technology deployments 
and needs, to determine if there would be any benefit to implementing mobile WiMax, 
possibly for outdoor use between buildings. 
11.3 Summary 
 
This project team has deployed Wireless Local Area Networking at Sandia National 
Laboratories!  The personnel on this project team, with the help of many colleagues and 
vendors, have learned a great deal about wireless networking.  They experimented with, 
and evaluated many aspects of wireless LAN hardware and systems.  They selected and 
procured the equipment and other materials for Sandia’s wireless LAN infrastructure.  
This team deployed pilots, both outside and inside of the exclusion areas.  They 
developed security procedures, and started production deployment of wireless local area 
networking at Sandia.  These people also developed a path forward for wireless 
networking at Sandia, into the future. 
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Appendix A Diffused Infrared Equipment 
 
Early in the project we examined Diffused Infrared (DFIR) as a possible technology for 
use inside the limited areas, where RF communication technologies might not be 
permitted.  Diffuse radiation is scattered out of the direct beam by refraction and 
reflection, as opposed to direct beam, which comes in a direct line from the source.  
DFIR fills an enclosed area, using the room’s surfaces (e.g. walls, ceiling) and surfaces of 
objects in the room (e.g. tables, cabinets) to bounce IR signals between the transmitter 
and the receiver.  (A further discussion of DFIR and a comparison to direct-beam IR can 
be found in [28].) 
 
DFIR systems are not able to support the higher data rates that RF systems are able to 
support, but IR is much easier to contain than RF.  Because IR signals do not penetrate 
walls, floors, etc., and are heavily attenuated by glass, DFIR could provide wireless data 
networking in confined or bounded indoor areas.  It would be possible to inadvertently 
couple information (as covered in the books by Cooper [8] [9]) to an infrared access 
point, but the effects would be limited by the inability of the IR waves to penetrate the 
walls, floor, and ceiling, thus being confined to the room. 
 
We found a company called Spectrix Corp. who claimed to have a system [19] that 
operates at 4 Mbps.  It included PC cards for laptop computers (that fit into a Type II 
PCMCIA slot), IR “antennas” that serve as access points, and Wireless Hub Routers that 
serve as controllers and protocol gateways for the system.  Each Wireless Hub Router can 
control eight or 16 antenna units and contained a 10/100Base-T uplink to connect into a 
wired Ethernet network.  Spectrix uses a proprietary MAC and PHY layer.  They employ 
a proprietary protocol between the PCMCIA card and the Wireless Hub Router, rather 
than the IR PHY layer of the 802.11 specification.  Beyond the Wireless Hub Router, 
standard Ethernet is used.  This system had a specified error rate of 10-6 over a 1000 
square foot area, but could vary with the environment. 
 
To determine if this system would serve our needs adequately, we used OPNET and ACE 
to perform modeling and simulation of likely-use scenarios.  Having previously 
determined there was strong interest in having the ability to process incoming and 
outgoing email while in meetings [28], we constructed scenarios involving reading email 
with no attachments, reading email with small (109 KB) attachments, reading email with 
large (2.1 MB) attachments, and sending email with no attachments from a conference 
room.  We modeled these scenarios for 1, 2, 3, 5,8, and 12 simultaneous users.  Since the 
modeling software did not have a 4 Mbps IR module, we felt using the 802.11 2 Mbps 
module would be a conservative choice.  The models showed that due to various buffer 
constraints and bottlenecks, the entire 2 Mbps bandwidth could not be used.  The results 
are summarized in Table 12. 
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Table 12. Data from OPNET Model Simulating 2 Mbps LAN. 
 Read email (no 
attachment) 
0.091 Mbits 
Read email (small 
attachment) 
0.874 Mbits 
Read email (large 
attachment) 
18.288 Mbits 
Send email (no 
attachment) 
0.749 Mbits 
 
Number 
of users 
Bandwith 
used 
(Mbps) 
Elapsed 
time 
(sec.) 
Bandwith 
used 
(Mbps) 
Elapsed 
time 
(sec.) 
Bandwith 
used 
(Mbps) 
Elapsed 
time 
(sec.) 
Bandwith 
used 
(Mbps) 
Elapsed 
time 
(sec.) 
1 0.01 16 0.10 18 0.25 71 0.08 17 
2 0.02 17 0.19 18 0.70 103 0.08 26 
3 0.03 17 0.28 18 1.5 54 0.12 26 
5 0.05 18 0.48 17 1.6 143 0.24 26 
8 0.08 18 0.60 26 1.6 180 0.58 26 
12 0.12 19 0.80 55 not run not run 0.90 27 
 
Note that this presents the worst case, that is when all 5, 8, 12, or however many users 
each click on “read mail” at the same instant.  Not everyone in a conference room will 
likely try to retrieve a message or send a message at exactly the same time.  Total elapsed 
times under 30 seconds could be provided for 12 simultaneous users reading or sending 
emails with no attachments or 8 simultaneous users reading retrieving emails with small 
(103 KB) attachments.  It would not be advisable to retrieve emails with large 
attachments (2.1 MB) in an area employing this system.  Based on these results and usage 
constraints, we felt this would be an acceptable system for conference rooms in areas 
where RF transmitters are not permitted for security reasons. 
 
We specified equipment to build a pilot DFIR wireless LAN covering several conference 
rooms, several office areas, and several laboratory areas.  When we contacted Spectrix 
(the only known vendor of DFIR LAN equipment) for pricing and ordering information, 
we found that they had apparently gone out of business.  We were not able to find other 
DFIR LAN equipment in production.  Because of this setback, we increased efforts to 
permit RF wireless LANs in areas that are within 100 feet of classified processing. 
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Appendix B Video Compression over Wireless Links 
 
Any review of applications for wireless should include high bandwidth applications.  One 
such application of interest to Sandia is high quality video-over-IP (IP here refers to 
Internet Protocol).  This class of applications attempts to transport a high resolution 
computer generated video (such as computer screen) made up of 1280x1024 pixels and 
up to 60 frames per second over an Ethernet network and reconstruct the images at the 
original frame rate at the remote site.  The required bandwidth for this data stream is 
approximately 2.5 Gbps (Gigabit per second, or 109 bits per second). 
 
Sandia has been actively developing hardware to deliver such high quality video for 
many years.  Most recently, Sandia has developed hardware that has been successfully 
transferred to the commercial company, Logical Solutions, which is marketing the device 
under the name “Global Link.”  The Global Link system consists of two devices, a 
transmitter that captures the video from a computer’s graphic card and sends UDP video 
packets over IP on a Gigibit Ethernet network.  The receiver device takes these video 
packets and regenerates a facsimile of the original video, at the original frame rate.  The 
Global Link was designed to operate optimally over either a direct connect (point-to-
point) or switched Gigabit Ethernet network. 
 
The Global Link was designed with considerations given to the IP network 
characteristics.  For instance, video data is transported over Ethernet using RTP (Real 
Time Protocol) and UDP (User Datagram Protocol) and IP (Internet Protocol).  RTP 
version 2 is defined in RFC 1889.  Specific RTP formats are generally described in 
RFCs, however, no RFC has been submitted for consideration for the Global Link format 
as of this writing.  RTP was chosen for this application because it is the standard Internet 
Protocol for transport of real-time data (including in this case, video data).  RTP is 
carried in UDP packets. 
 
UDP is a connectionless transport protocol, i.e. fire and forget.  There is no guaranteed 
delivery of the data from the transmitter to the receiver.  This results in specific network 
behavior that must be considered when constructing a protocol for any application using 
this transport mechanism, such as video-over-IP.  Under conditions of congestion, 
network switches are programmed to drop UDP packets first, preserving as much of the 
TCP (Transmission Control Protocol) traffic as possible.  The result is, for a protocol to 
work well with the network, each packet must be self-contained and the loss of any 
particular packet’s data, due to it being dropped by the network, must not affect any other 
packet.  Therefore each packet contains an address describing the location where the 
packet’s data should be placed on the screen at the remote receiver.  To understand the 
effect of the network on the delivery of video and subsequently the quality of the 
reconstructed screen, one must understand the format of the video being transported. 
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Transport of Video Packets 
 
The key to a successful video-over-IP protocol is the way a screen is subdivided and the 
data is enclosed in the Ethernet packet.  The screen, of course, is made up of pixels, each 
pixel described by three color values (Red, Green and Blue, i.e. RGB).  Each color is 
decribed by 8 bits resulting in 24 bits per pixel.  In this context, the Global Link system 
divides the screen into blocks of data called segments.  A segment is defined as a linear 
group of pixels on a single horizontal line.  In the 1280x1024 format, for instance, a 
segment is one fourth of a horizontal line or 320 pixels.  Each segment consists of a total 
of 960 bytes.  There are 4096 pixels on the screen, numbered 0 to 4095.  Segments are 
ordered starting in the upper left hand corner of the screen (segment 0) and proceeding 
left to right and top to bottom to the lower right corner (segment 4095).  The size of the 
segment is chosen to maximize the data in the Ethernet packet, thus improving the 
network efficiency, while keeping the data in each packet the same size, thus making it 
easier to pull apart the incoming packet and store the data in the receiver’s video frame.  
The size of the segment is dependent on the screen size and aspect ratio.  Below is a table 
(Table 13) of proposed segment sizes for several standard screen formats. 
 
Table 13. Frame Formats. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Format     HOR x VERT  Segment     Segments per   Segments per    Bytes per 
                       Size(*)     Frame          Horiz Line      Segment 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
VGA-60     640x480     160         960            2               960 
SVGA-60    800x600     200         1200           2               1200 
XGA-60     1024x768    128         3072           4               768 
SXGA-60    1280x1024   160         4096           4               960 
UXGA-60    1600x1200   160         6000           5               960 
QXGA-60    2048x1536   128         12288          8               768 
QSXGA-60   2560x2048   160         16384          8               960 
1920-60    1920x1024   160         6144           6               960 
1920A-60   1920x1200   160         7200           6               960 
2000-60    2000x2000   200         10000          5               1200 
 
*The segment size is specified in double pixels (dp) which are 
represented by 48 bits (6 bytes).  A pixel is represented by 
24 bits (3 bytes), in the normal red-green-blue format. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Data Packet Format 
 
The data packet is enclosed in a specialized version of the standard RTP format.  The 
RTP fields are defined as follows: 
 
Version (VER) = 2 
 
Marker bit (M) = marker bit is set to one for the last segment of a video frame 
 
Payload Type (PT) = Defined according to RFC 1890.  Suggested PT = 24 with a clock 
rate of 90000 Hz. 
 
Sequence Number (SEQ) = A 16 bit count that is incremented with each RTP packet. 
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Timestamp (TS) = 32 bit 90 kHz timestamp representing the time of the first segment of 
each frame.  All RTP packets of the same frame have the same timestamp. 
 
Synchronous Source ID (SID) = 16 bit value is the source ID of the video stream. 
 
The RTP payload (Figure 19) consists of a Frame Segment Header (FSH), Extended 
Header (EH), Video Data (VD) and a Segment Trailer (ST).  The FSH contains 
information such as the header type, screen format, frame count and segment count.  
When a packet is received, the segment number is used to insert the segment data in the 
video buffer. 
 
31                                  0 
|-----------------------------------| 
|       Frame Segment Header        | 
|-----------------------------------| 
|   (optional) Extended Header(s)   | 
|-----------------------------------| |        Video/Audio Data           | |-----------------------------------| 
|        Segment Trailer            | |-----------------------------------| 
 
Figure 19. RTP Payload Description. 
 
Updating the Screen 
 
Two triggers are used to determine when to send a segment of data to the receiver.  The 
first method sends a segment of data if a change is detected in any of the pixels in the 
segment.  The result is that even a single bit change will result in an entire segment being 
transmitted.  While this method is bandwidth wasteful, it was chosen because it results in 
more rapid insertion of the update data in the receiver.  Several methods of compressing 
the data in the segment (only sending the modified data) have been proposed, but are 
outside the scope of this paper.  A second, independent trigger is used called the seed 
process.  Seeding is used to update the screen during startup and to renew an entire screen 
after extended network outages.  The seed process uses pseudo random number generator 
to send a segment of data regardless of whether a change was detected.  The most 
commonly used parameters results in a complete screen update approximately every 2 
seconds.  In this way, every pixel on the screen is updated at least once every two 
seconds, constantly correcting any pixels lost in transmission. 
 
Configuration 
 
Three network configurations were used to conduct the tests.  Also specific Global Link 
hardware and software configurations were used in the testing.  These configurations are 
described in the following sections. 
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Network Configurations 
 
The three network configurations used for the video testing were direct connection, 
connection through a commodity/consumer-grade router/switch, and connection over a 
wireless bridge.  These are shown in Figures 20, 21, and 22. 
 
 
 
Figure 20. Direct Connection Network Configuration. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 21. Consumer-Grade Router/Switch Network Configuration. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 22. Wireless Bridge Network Configuration. 
 
 
Hardware Configuration of the Global Link 
 
The Global Link Encoder and Decoder consist of two separate boards, one for video 
processing and one with a PC running an embedded Red Hat Linux.  The video board 
contains the input and output video sections, an Altera 1S30 Stratix FPGA chip for actual 
video processing and SDRAM for video frame storage.  The FPGA also connects to 
Ethernet through a separate MAC chip.  The Linux connects to a 10/100 port on the 
embedded Ethernet switch chip and thus has access to the single 1 GigaBit Ethernet 
(GBE) network connection at the rear of the box.  Linux can also access a JTAG port on 
the video board, which is used to push a JAM file and configure the FPGA and an I2C 
port, which is used to load the configuration parameters into the FPGA.  
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Software Configuration of the Global Link 
 
The embedded Linux processor serves three functions.  The first is to download the 
FPGA configuration JAM file into the FPGA on power-up over the JTAG port.  The 
second is to download the configuration parameters into the FPGA registers over the I2C 
port.  The third is to make a connection between the decoder and the encoder over which 
it sends keyboard and mouse commands and data. 
 
The configuration files are found in the following tree structure, shown in Figure 23. 
 
Global Link File Structure
GLenchdw.conf
GLencoder.conf
GLtab.encoder
cgf
Contains FPGA configuration files
GLenc_link.jam
fpga
Contains FPGA jam files
ad9888-u6-dyncfg.tcl
bcm5382m-u36-mode.tcl
b1233-u44-chkKN.tcl
GLcff.tcl
GLconfig.tcl
GLded.tcl
GLreadfpga.tcl
jamplayer.lsi
sbin
Contains tcl scripts
/opt/Global_Link
 
 
Figure 23. File Structure for Global Link Configuration Files. 
 
The files shown here are only the ones related to programming the FPGA and configuring 
the registers in the FPGA.  These files are over ridden by a similarly named file located in 
the /etc/opt/Global_Link tree.  If a file is found in the /etc/opt tree, then this file is used.  
If not, the file in the /opt tree is the default. 
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Configuration Registers 
 
For this set of experiments, the /etc/opt/Global_Link/cfg/GLenchdw.conf  file is used to 
change the packet rate of the encoder.  An example of this file is shown here. 
 
##################################################################
### 
# Logical Solutions Inc 
# Project: Global Link 
# Name: GLenchdw.conf 
# Description: Encoder Hardware Config File 
# Hardware Configuration for the Video 
section 
# Location: Encoder 
# Date: 2004-09-20-1114 
# History:  
##################################################################
### 
 
# device for the KM host emulation (physical KM) 
KMhstSP=/dev/ttyS4 
 
# device for the KM device emulation (cpu KM) 
KMdevSP=/dev/ttyS5 
 
# device for the serial to i2c converter 
BL233SP=/dev/ttyS6 
 
# port for the parallel port 
JamIO=0x20c0 
 
# local unit’s mac address 
SouMAC=$MACPROM$ 
 
# interpacket gap / control 
IpgIP=255.1.1.1 
 
# FPGA configuration file 
FPGAfile=GLenc_link.jam 
 
 
A number of encoder parameters are controlled by the four bytes in the Inter Packet Gap, 
IpgIP.  As delivered from the factory, the IpgIP = 255.1.1.1.  This parameter represents a 
32 bit value in four octet IP address format.  Understanding the operation of these bits 
takes some explanation. 
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First, the IpgIP consists of the following fields. 
 
Bits 31..24 23..16 15..8 7..0 
IpgIP Control Register Reserved Interpacket 
Gap Register 
Reserved 
 
The Packetizer State Machine is controlled by the contents of the high byte of the IpgIP 
register, called the Control Register.  The bit values are defined below.  This register can 
be used to reset either the transmit or receive state machines in the IP_PACKETIZER 
block of the FPGA HDL, halt video traffic and adjust the seed rate or even shut off 
seeding.  Seeding is the sending of all screen segments regardless of whether a change 
has been detected.  When confronted with a network that is highly lossy, seeding is 
essential to repair any damage to the screen image due to packet loss.  The bits of the 
Control Register is shown below. 
 
CTL is the upper 8 bits of the IPG.  So, the ENCODER has the 
following definitions: 
 
CTL[7] = undefined 
CTL[6] = rx_reset 
CTL[5] = tx_reset 
CTL[4] = state_machine_reset_n 
CTL[3] = undefined 
CTL[2] = videodataon 
CTL[1] = seed_off_n 
CTL[0] = seed_slow_n 
 
CTL[0] controls seed_slow_n. When low seed rate is slower. Changes 
the modulus in the counter from 31 to 127. 
 
CTL[1] controls seed_off_n. When low seeding is off. 
 
CTL[2] controls the video output.  When low, the video is not 
transmitted.  This is useful to shut off the video back stream 
from the decoder. 
 
 
So as an example, to turn off video data, change the IPG value from 255.1.1.1 to 
251.1.1.1.  The Video data control bit is bit 2 of the IPG control register.  To activate the 
new IpgIP value type in GLconfig –c C and hit return. 
 
The packet rate transmitted by the Encoder must meet the Gigabit Ethernet specifications 
[20].  For 802.3z (found in IEEE 802.3-2002 specification) the time between Ethernet 
Frames at Gigabit Ethernet is specified to be greater than 96 nanoseconds.  The third byte 
of the IpgIP register is the Interpacket Gap Register.  This 8 bit value controls how many 
clock cycles of the 100 MHz clock are used as a delay between the sending of IP packets 
to the MAC chip.  There is a minimum value which is represented by the ‘1’ and meets 
GBE specifications.  Numbers higher lead to longer delays and ultimately lower bit rates.  
A ‘10’ is approximately 100 Mbps while a ‘100’ is about 10 Mbps.  Values larger than 
‘100’ have little more effect on the bit rate. 
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The delay counter is a 32-bit counter running at the 33 MHz clock rate (a period of 
30.3 ns).  The counter starts when the destination Ethernet address is pushed into the 
MAC fifo and continues as the rest of the packet is pushed into the MAC chip.  That is, 
the counter runs all during the packet transfer and continues after it has been completed.  
After the entire Ethernet packet is completed, the transmit state machine waits in a delay 
state until the counter reaches the value defined by: 
 
0x0000 & IpgIP[15..8] & 0xFF, 
 
where ‘&’ is used to indicate bit concatenation. 
 
At this point, the state machine continues and can send another packet.  The minimum 
time that it can take to send a packet is 0x000001FF = 511 counts, which takes 15.5 µs 
(511*30.3 ns).  During that period of time, the state machine will have transmitted 
1025*8 bits. The packet rate is then calculated to be 
 
MbpsEbytebitsbytesDataRate 530sec)65.15/()/81025( =−×= . 
 
In the same manner, an IpgIP[15..8] setting of 0x0A yields a data rate of 96.1 Mbps and a 
setting of 0x64 results in 10.5 Mbps.  The maximum setting, 0xFF, results in 65535 
counts at 30.3 ns per count, setting the slowest data rate at 4.1 Mbps. 
 
On both the Encoder and Decoder you can read back the IPG and differencing by using 
the GLconfig –c R. 
 
Once the file has been changed, updates are pushed into the FPGA registers using the 
“GLconfig –c C” command.  This command updates everything except the network and 
the JAM file.  Other options are listed here. 
 
 - GLconfig 
  -v  :displays the version. 
  -c C :configures all but network and jam 
  -c S :configures network only  
  -c J :load jam file only 
  -c A :configures the ad9888 only 
  -c F :configures the FPGA parmeters only 
  -c R :shows the configuration including the added 
 
The Encoder and Decoder were configured with the following IP Addresses. 
 
Device Type Linux Video 
Encoder 10.9.8.7 10.9.8.5 
Decoder 10.9.8.8 10.9.8.6 
74 
 
Network Behavior 
 
The quality of the video at the receiver varies depending on a number of factors 
including; the quality of the network, network congestion, network speed and network 
architecture. 
 
The design of the Global Link is intended to insure frame integrity at the receiver.  Each 
changed segment of a complete frame is sent to the receiver before the next frame is 
started.  If the network is slow enough, and if the number of segments that need to be 
transmitted is large enough, several frames might be skipped during the time it takes to 
transmit the changes.  In this way, video compression takes place by dropping frames.  
This insures that each frame appears at the receiver exactly as it appeared in the original 
video.  This is very important for a large variety of applications. 
 
It is obvious is that the higher the bandwidth available the higher the quality of the 
reconstructed video.  But there are a host of network conditions, which result in artifacts 
on the screen. 
 
When packets are dropped, some updates do not make it, obviously, to the receiver video 
frame buffer.  Therefore, there are segments of the screen that are not updated properly 
and will display stale pixels.  Since the segments are only one pixel tall, often the data is 
just a really small change and not noticed.  However, if the network congestion is bursty 
and large sections of the screen have been changed from one frame to the next, there 
might be linear groups of segments that will be in error.  Assuming that the congestion is 
only temporary, the random seeding process will update these segments over the next two 
seconds. 
 
Description of the Test Applications 
 
The purpose of these studies is to determine the behavior of the Global Link video system 
operating over several different real-world network architectures including high-speed 
wireless infrastructure. 
 
For each architecture under evaluation, especially stressful full motion video was used to 
determine how well the link handled the video IP traffic.  The sample of full motion 
video is a 15 fps sample, 320x240 pixels in size, captured from a live NTSC broadcast.  
This sample was converted into a Quicktime 7 format and played, full screen, on the 
computer.  The video content was chosen because it represents a high frame rate and a 
large percentage of the pixels on the screen are changing every frame thus providing the 
greatest stress on the network. 
 
Video Quality with Wired Ethernet 
 
Under normal operation, the encoder and decoder are connected, back-to-back, using a 
single twisted pair Ethernet connection.  Whether connected via a single cable or through 
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a gigabit Ethernet switch, the encoder transmits data at around 450 Mbps.  The encoder 
can be configured to send packets at slower rates such as 100 Mbps and 10 Mbps used in 
tests 1, 2 and 3.  In the back-to-back configuration at GBE rates (Table 14, entry 1), the 
video is nearly as good as that viewed on the monitor directly connected to the source 
computer.  The explosions in this segment of the video are quite good. 
 
When the encoder transmission rate was reduced to 100 Mbps (Table 14, entry 2), the 
video update rate begins to suffer.  The full motion sample suffered the most as the 
screen began to show signs of slow scanning updates.  The static screen example was still 
able to keep up with moving windows and would be quite acceptable for text editing 
applications or even web surfing.  In the picture, you can see the transition between the 
new frame (top) and the old frame (bottom).  In between, there are a large number of 
original video frames that are missing and were never sent. 
 
When the encoder transmission rate was reduced to 10 Mbps (Table 14, entry 3), the 
video resembled slow-scan video, with associated frame rate reduction down to a few 
frames per second.  This rate was unacceptably slow for viewing full motion video.  
However, each frame does appear on the screen without tears and in full high resolution.  
The static sample was usable, however it would be unacceptably slow when larger 
windows were being updated.  In the picture, we again see the frame transition as a 
horizontal line. 
 
The encoder and decoder were also interconnected through a 100 Mbps Ethernet switch 
(Table 14, entries 4, 5 and 6).  The behavior through the switch depended on the selected 
transmission rate of the encoder.  At all transmission rates it was evident that the Ethernet 
switch was having problems with the high flow rate of packets.  For this application, the 
packets are metered to appear at a constant rate.  It would appear that the Ethernet switch 
was designed to handle more bursty data and had a very hard time with the constant flow 
of packets.  At the highest rates, the encoder swamped the Ethernet switch; the result 
being a large number of lost packets.  The screen then suffered from many segments that 
were not updated.  When the data rate was reduced, so that the switch could handle the 
incoming packets without loss, the screen again resembled slow scan video.  In this case 
the frame update rate is reduced significantly.  Even at the lower data rate there were a 
considerable number of missing packets.  In (Table 14, entry 5) the screen size is 
reduced, however, the image is still not very sharp. 
 
Once the data rate is reduced to 10 Mbps (Table 14, entry 6) the full screen can be 
updated, a frame at a time, with no loss of data. 
 
Video Quality with Wireless Ethernet 
 
The encoder and decoder were interconnected via a wireless bridge and operated at 54 
Mbps (Table 14, entries 7 – 11).  The bridge devices were Netgear Model WGE101 54 
Mbps Wireless Ethernet Bridge.   
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When we blast away at the wireless bridge (Table 14, entry 7), the wireless bridge that is 
connected to encoder begins to drop lots of packets.  Keep in mind that the actual data 
rate achieved across the wireless link is significantly less than 54 Mbps signaling rate.  
We begin to see the four sections of the screen used for sectioning.  The effect is viewing 
portions of two scenes and many multiple frames of each all at once.  It would be 
impossible to use this link for anything productive. 
 
When the encoder data rate is reduced to 100 Mbps (Table 14, entry 8) the situation 
improved slightly with less packet loss (since we are sending less packets in the first 
place).  However the screen still looks messy. 
 
Reducing the data rate to 10 Mbps (Table 14, entry 9) help a lot.  Larger sections of the 
screen are from the same scene.  However, since we are now down to 3 seconds to 
transmit a single screen, the update rate is not acceptable given that the screen is still 
broken.  Note that the four segments are not as noticeable in the screen image. 
` 
When the video window is reduced to the native 230x240 size (Table 14, entry 10) and 
the data rate is kept at 10 Mbps, the background clears up (with transmission redundancy) 
and the video window frame rate improves significantly.  Still the image is much cleaner. 
 
Making the video window about one quarter smaller still (Table 14, entry 11) makes the 
image look quite nice.  However we are approaching the point where the seed packet rate 
is approaching the update packet rate and further improvements are incremental. 
 
Stopping the seeding (Table 14, entry 11) does not help because any lost packets in areas 
of the screen that are not directly affected by the video window might not get updated for 
quite some time.  This would include other windows and the mouse cursor. 
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The results are summarized in the table below.  The descriptions relate to the photos in 
the right most column. 
 
Table 14. Video Quality Comparison. 
 
 Configuration Description of the Quality 
of the Video 
Photos 
  Twisted Pair (TWP) Ethernet 
direct connect 
 
1      ~450 Mbps High quality video with little 
evidence of frame drops.  Not 
discernable from a directly 
connected monitor. 
 
2      100 Mbps Video becomes noticeable 
slower, approximately 3 fps.  
Each updated frame is high 
quality, no lost packets. 
 
3      10 Mbps Best described as slow scan 
video, 3 seconds per frame. 
Each updated frame is high 
quality, no lost packets. 
 
  Connected via wired side of 
MR814V2 Wireless Router 
 
4      ~450 Mbps This is only a 100 Mbps 
switch and many packets are 
being lost. 
 
5      100 Mbps Much the same results, even 
when the video is only a 
small part of the screen, still 
have many lost packets. 
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6      10 Mbps No evidence of lost packets, 
screen looks great.  However, 
video is slow scan, 3 seconds 
per frame like when using 
TWP interconnect. 
 
  Connected via 802.11g 
Wireless Bridges 
 
7      ~450 Mbps The wireless bridge 
connected to Encoder is 
dropping lots of packets at all 
speeds.  Not suitable for 
viewing. 
 
8      100 Mbps Still over-running the links 
ability to handle the data rate. 
 
9      10 Mbps Believe it or not, this looks 
better, slower scan rate is 
leading to fewer dropped 
packets. 
 
10 10 Mbps, smaller 
changing video 
window 
This looks a lot better, getting 
pretty good frame rate, still 
not totally clear with dropped 
frames. 
 
11 10 Mbps, even 
smaller video 
window 
Now we are likely matching 
seed rate and update rate, 
video looks good, but still 
some dropped packets. 
 
 
 
79 
Summary of Compressed Video over Wireless Link Testing 
 
The Global Link product was designed for use at Gigabit Ethernet rates and works best at 
these speeds.  High frame rate video data is transmitted at nearly a constant rate due to 
the design of the hardware implemented IP stack.  Ethernet switches are designed to 
handle packets in short burst.  Generally, this is the case because some processor has to 
buffer up the data prior to transmission.  The video encoder performs this task in 
hardware and so can transmit data at a flat rate.  Subsequently, it is easy for the Global 
Link hardware to over-run the network hardware buffers (which as a rule, are not very 
large) and the network begins to drop packets.  As the data rates are reduced, the screen 
updates begin to resemble slow scan video with frames being painted from top to bottom.  
Video packets are evenly spaced in time.  If the packet rate is reduced to the point that the 
fifos do not fill, then the screen would be updated, segment-by-segment, from top to 
bottom.  The frame rate will be greatly reduced, however the video frame will be 
transmitted in tact. 
 
When connected through an 802.11g wireless bridge, the effective network data rate is 
reduced significantly.  Packets are dropped even with the video bandwidth reduced below 
10 Mbps.  The video frame rate can be improved by making the video window smaller. 
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